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ABSTRACT 
 I study the interactions between food prices, food retail environment and food demand. 
Given the rising debate on how to improve the quality of food purchases and consumption by 
changing the food geography in the United States, the overall goal of my dissertation is to 
understand the nature, causes and impact of living in a food desert (low-income areas with 
limited access to supermarkets) in the United States.  
Low-income households have poorer diets and higher rates of obesity than high-income 
households in the United States. However, it is unclear why these disparities exist. Poor diets can 
be driven by three factors: limited availability of healthy foods, higher prices of healthy foods, or 
preferences for unhealthy foods. Depending on which of these causes hold, improving access to 
healthy foods may or may not have an effect on the foods purchased by households living in 
food deserts. 
The first chapter of my dissertation studies the first two potential drivers of poor diets, prices 
and availability. I compare food prices and availability between food deserts and non-food 
deserts to observe whether and to what extent consumers face higher prices for a complete diet in 
food deserts. If a nutritionally complete diet costs significantly more in food deserts, resident 
consumers may be constrained from consuming healthier foods. I am able to attribute a dollar 
value to the importance of food variety and incorporate food variety into the calculation of the 
price index to allow for the availability of food products to differ across food deserts and non-
food deserts 
I use the 2012 IRI InfoScan that records weekly store-level sales in a nationally 
representative sample of counties at over 15,000 retailers to identify the products available and 
prices of these products offered in each census tract. In doing so, I calculate a census-tract level 
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Exact Price Index (EPI) based on store sales in home and contiguous census tracts and a food 
basket defined by the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP). The EPI addresses potential biases from both 
product heterogeneity and product variety.  
I find that after controlling for observable demand, the stores charge slightly higher prices 
(0.9%) and have lower food availability (2.6%) in low access tracts than in their high access 
counterparts. In combination, the variety-adjusted price index is only 3.5% higher in low access 
areas. The small difference in EPI between food deserts and non-food deserts suggests both 
limited market power of existing stores in food deserts and a relatively small welfare impact of 
living in a food desert, at least for those who can travel to neighboring census tracts to shop.  
The second chapter of my dissertation studies whether better availability or lower prices of 
fruits and vegetables in food deserts improves consumers’ welfare; both policies are 
implemented in the real world. I use a structural estimation approach from the industrial 
organization literature and estimate a discrete choice demand for different types of food stores. I 
explicitly model consumer demand with spatial differentiation and heterogeneous preferences. If 
the existence of food deserts is caused by lower demand for access to healthy foods, then 
improving food access alone will not be effective in changing consumer behavior. Thus it is 
important to allow consumers in food deserts and non-food deserts to have differential 
preferences for store proximity and other store attributes. With specific knowledge of 
consumers’ demand and preferences, I can conduct counterfactual analyses and study the welfare 
implications of intervention policies on food deserts ex ante.   
I use a panel of quantities and prices for 174 food stores from 11 randomly chosen mid-sized 
counties over a period of 16 quarters (2009-2012), collected using scanning devices from 
Information Resources Inc. (IRI). Store characteristics come from Nielsen TDLinx store 
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directory data and census-tract level socio-demographics from 2008-2012 American Community 
Survey (ACS). The census-tract level food deserts indicators are from 2010 USDA Food Access 
Research Atlas. 
I find that first, price is the most important factor when consumers decide where to shop and 
is much more important than availability of fruits and vegetables and store proximity. Second, 
consumer’s welfare does not greatly increase when the number of fruits and vegetables are 
increased by a small amount in each store nearest to a food desert. This result flows from the fact 
that consumers do not value availability of fruits and vegetables as much as prices, and most 
consumers have access to vehicles and are thus less constrained by store distances to shop in the 
nearest supermarkets. Third, fruits and vegetables price subsidies are more effective policies to 
improve consumer welfare and have better distributional effects that they benefit food deserts 
households more. Lastly, food deserts households have lower demand for better access to fruits 
and vegetables and may explain, at least in part, why food deserts exist. 
Building on the second chapter, in the third chapter I incorporate supply side price 
competition and producers’ surplus into the welfare analysis of supermarket entry. Specifically, I 
evaluate the welfare impact of a subsidy to a low-cost grocery store to enter food deserts. Thus I 
consider the full effect of the entry of a new grocery store, not just on increased food availability 
but also on prices in existing stores. As found in chapter 2, price is the most important factor in 
consumers’ choices of stores. Thus incorporating price effect and supply side allows us to more 
accurately assess the total policy impact.  
I use a multinomial mixed logit demand model combined with a Nash-Bertrand price 
competition model to analyze the food store retail industry. After obtaining consumer 
preferences and cost parameters, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to see what happens when a 
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low-cost grocery store comes to the most severe food desert in the county. I use Walmart 
Neighborhood Market (WNM) as an example of a low-cost grocery store because WNM offers 
prices that are 10%-15% lower than an average grocery store, which may be particularly 
appealing to low-income consumers and is expanding fast in the U.S. recently. The most severe 
food desert is the low-access census block group with the highest poverty rate within a county.  
I use USDA’s new National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) 
combined with 2012 IRI InfoScan to estimate consumers’ food store choices and food stores’ 
pricing behavior and distribution of marginal costs. The FoodAPS contains detailed information 
about the foods purchased or acquired by surveyed households for at-home consumption and 
away-from-home in 2012. The 2012 Information Resources Inc. (IRI) InfoScan records weekly 
barcode level sales and quantities sold in major food chain stores that cover over 80% of grocery 
purchases in the US. These data allow me to address limitations in the literature that are critical 
to understanding store choices and policy interventions to improve food access. 
There are three central findings from the analyses. First, price is the most important store 
attribute when consumers decide where to shop, especially for food deserts (FD) households. 
Second, after a low-cost grocery store comes to the most severe food desert, FD households 
benefit more than NFD households. On the supply side, larger grocery stores and stores that are 
close to the incoming new grocery store are more negatively affected. Third, the average annual 
county-level social welfare increases by $219,810, in which consumer welfare increases by 
$3,843,880 and producer welfare decreases by $3,624,070. In addition, the fixed costs of 
operating a low-cost grocery store in the most severe food deserts is more than the variable profit 
obtained, thus casting doubt on the effectiveness of the policy to subsidize low-cost grocery 
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stores into the most severe food deserts. This result is robust across various low-cost grocery 
retail chains including WNM and Food 4 Less.  
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CHAPTER 1: Does a Nutritious Diet Cost More in Food Deserts? 
 
Abstract 
 
Food deserts and their potential effects on diet and nutrition have received much attention from 
policymakers. While some research has found a correlation between food deserts and consumer 
outcomes, it is unclear whether food deserts truly affect consumer choices. In this article, we 
compare food prices in food deserts, defined as low-income, low-access census tracts, and non-
food deserts to observe whether and to what extent consumers face higher prices for a complete 
diet in food deserts. If a nutritionally complete diet costs significantly more in food deserts, 
resident consumers may be constrained from consuming healthier foods. We use store-level 
scanner data from a nationally representative sample and calculate a census-tract level Exact 
Price Index (EPI) based on a food basket defined by the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP). The EPI 
addresses potential biases from both product heterogeneity and variety availability. We find that 
the overall price impact of living in a food desert is small; low-access areas have only 3.5% 
higher EPI than high-access counterparts. However, consumers who are constrained to shop 
within their own census tracts face a much higher EPI than high-access counterparts (9.2%). The 
higher EPI primarily comes from lower variety availability in food deserts.  
 
 
Keywords: food deserts, food price, price indices, product variety, nutritious diet 
 
JEL codes: Q18, D40, L66, R32, I3 
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1.1 Introduction 
Limited access to healthy food in the U.S. has been associated with poorer diet quality 
(Morland, Wing and Roux 2002; Bodor et al. 2008; Zenk et al. 2009; Michimi and Wimberly 
2010), and a higher probability of obesity and other dietary related health problems (Larson, 
Story and Nelson 2009; Carroll-Scott, 2013). In addition, households with lower socio-economic 
status are more likely to live in food deserts and purchase less healthful food (Binkley and Golub 
2011; Handbury, Rahkovsky and Schnell 2016; Allcott, Diamond and Dube 2017). In response, 
federal, state, and local initiatives have emerged to address the challenge of food deserts, 
including subsidizing large grocery retailers to move into underserved areas, improving food 
options in corner stores, and encouraging mobile grocery vendors. Multiple states have also 
enacted legislation aimed at increasing the number of healthy food retailers or have subsidized 
local stores to provide fresh fruits and vegetables.   
Implicit in these interventions is the idea that food deserts, defined as geographic areas with 
low-income and low food access, are thought to have higher food prices and lower availability of 
healthy foods than non-food deserts. These assumptions are based on case-study comparisons of 
food prices and availability that focus on a single community (e.g. Chung and Meyers 1999; 
Block and Kouba 2005; Andreyeva et al. 2008) or one or two store chains (e.g. Hatzenbuehler, 
Gillespie and O’Neil 2012). Other studies compare prices of specific food items, such as fresh 
fruits and vegetables (e.g. Hayes 2000; USDA 2009). However, recent studies such as Handbury, 
Rahkovsky and Schnell (2016) document that prices of commonly available goods are actually 
not significantly different in food deserts versus non-food deserts based on a large sample of 
stores and food items across the United States. In this article, we further include access to variety 
into the price index and compare the variety-adjusted price index between food deserts and non-
 
 
3 
food deserts. We specifically compare food prices in food desert census tracts to those in census 
tracts of similar income but higher food access, and census tracts of similar access but higher 
income to differentiate the effect of access and income on price and availability.  
We use weekly barcode level store sales data for a nationally representative geographic 
sample from Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) in 2012 and build a localized price index for each 
census tract to be able to relate it to the same geographic scale used to designate food deserts. 
We define an affordable and nutritious diet following the USDA Thrifty Food Plan (TFP), which 
is a minimum cost diet based on low-income households’ purchasing behavior and nutritional 
guidelines.  
We construct a localized TFP Exact Price Index (EPI) following the approach developed by 
Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2010) and applied by Handbury and Weinstein (2014) 
(see Feenstra 2010 for a review of its use).1 Our localized TFP EPI is composed of both a 
Conventional Exact Price Index (CEPI) that accounts for the prices of food available in the 
census tract and a Variety Adjustment (VA) term that addresses the problem that some foods are 
unavailable in some locations, causing variety bias. Assuming nested Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) preferences, the price index measures the minimum cost needed for 
consumers to achieve the same level of utility in a census tract. The VA uses both estimated 
elasticities of substitution and national expenditure shares of each barcode to capture the impact 
of variety on prices. We use barcode-level prices rather than average costs for broad food 
categories to ensure we are not comparing prices for different product qualities, called product 
heterogeneity. Handbury and Weinstein (2014) show that after controlling for product 
                                                
1 Broda and Weinstein (2010) construct the annual nation-level EPI for all consumer goods including non-food items 
such medicine, electronics and appliances in the U.S.. Handbury and Weinstein (2014) devise the city-level EPI for 
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heterogeneity and variety availability across cities, contrary to previous findings, larger cities 
have lower food prices than smaller cities. 
After constructing the price indices, we regress the CEPI, VA and EPI against a low access 
indicator variable and a number of factors that influence demand including neighborhood 
socioeconomic variables and county fixed effects. We restrict our analysis to urban census tracts 
to avoid comparing food deserts across different definitions in urban and rural areas. The 
purpose of this regression analysis is to study how stores’ prices differ across neighborhoods 
with observably equivalent demand. Research has demonstrated that stores in areas with a 
limited number of competitors possess greater market power and charge higher prices (Smith 
2004). Although the regression results from our study cannot be interpreted as causal, they 
provide evidence of the extent of pricing and variety differences by income levels and access to 
stores.  
Our article makes several contributions to the literature on food deserts. First, we construct a 
theoretically founded price index that overcomes a large number of problems that have plagued 
spatial price index measurement, i.e. product heterogeneity and variety bias. Second, the variety-
adjusted price index (EPI) combines and quantifies the monetary value of food price and food 
availability based on a unified framework. In doing so, we can evaluate the welfare impact of 
living in a food desert where high food prices and low food availability are two major concerns.  
One reason for the concern about these price effects is the common assumption that healthy 
foods are more expensive and/or less available in food deserts. To rigorously address this issue, a 
theoretically sound price index that accounts for food availability is needed. So, we construct a 
theoretically founded price index at the census tract level and, through this, identify both whether 
a standard basket of food has a similar price in food deserts and non-food deserts, and whether 
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there are differences in the availability of foods. The former helps us identify whether a standard 
set of foods which, by definition, include “healthy foods” are more expensive and the latter helps 
us identify whether there are variety differences which are often associated with “healthy eating”.  
Dietary diversity and variety are key elements of high quality diets (Kant et al. 1993; Ruel 2003; 
Lo et al. 2013). Increasing the variety of foods across and within food groups is recommended in 
most dietary guidelines, both in the U.S. (HHS and USDA 2015) and internationally (WHO 
2015). Diet quality depends on consumer choices, which are affected by the food prices, 
availability and retail environment they face (Staudigel 2012). Therefore, availability, variety 
and prices are key issues for policymakers when deciding what to do about food deserts, if 
anything.  
Our central findings are as follows. First, when the observable demand is equivalent, stores 
in low access census tracts charge slightly higher (0.9%) prices and have lower food availability 
(2.6%) than their high-access counterparts. Combined, the variety-adjusted price index is 3.5% 
higher in low-access areas, which may not be high enough to deter food deserts residents from 
consuming more healthy foods. Second, this 3.5% price difference found between low access 
and high access areas is driven by a lack of supermarkets. However, given the small price 
difference, supermarket entry may have limited effects on enabling a more affordable basket of a 
wide array of food products. Third, we find substantial heterogeneity in the price effect of being 
in a food desert. Consumers who are constrained to shop within their resident census tracts face 
significantly higher prices (9.2%) in low-access tracts than high-access counterparts and are 
therefore more negatively affected by living in a food desert.  
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1.2 Methods 
We begin with the intuition behind the potential gains from variety illustrated in figure 1 
(Feenstra 2010). Suppose a consumer gains utility from the consumption of two goods available 
in local market c (q1c and q2c). If the consumer has access to both goods, then to achieve the level 
of utility, AD, the consumer would choose to consume at point C and only spend the amount of 
money denoted by EF. However, if q2c is not available in the local market, to achieve the same 
utility level of AD, the consumer can only choose point A as the consumption bundle and needs 
to spend more money indicated by the minimum cost line AB. How much the cost will increase 
depends on the per-unit utility of the missing good and the substitutability of the available good 
compared to the missing one. The increase in cost needed to achieve the same level of utility 
when one does not have access to all varieties of goods formulates the gains from variety 
(Feenstra 1994). The variety-adjusted price index (EPI) is the relative minimum cost to obtain a 
basket of food for consumers in a local market. The theoretical model is adapted from Broda and 
Weinstein (2010) and Handbury and Weinstein (2014) and is provided in appendix A to explain 
how the expression of EPI is derived to capture the minimum cost to achieve the same level of 
utility across local markets. 
There are two components of the EPI. One is the unadjusted price index, the CEPI. It 
measures the prices of foods that are available in the local market and is given by the weighted 
product of the price index of each food group. Specifically, the weight Wgc is the log-ideal CES 
Sato (1976) and Vartia (1976) weights that give more weight to food groups that are more 
important in the local market (a detailed definition of Wgc is provided in appendix B). The CEPI 
for food group g in local market c is given by
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CEPIgc =
Vuc / Quc
Vuc / Quc
c
∑
c
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟u∈Ugc
∏
Wuc
             (1)
 
where Vuc and Quc are local expenditure and quantity spent on Universal Product Code (UPC or 
barcode) u across all stores in local market c, Ugc is the set of all UPCs of food group g available 
in the local market. The variable Wuc are the Sato and Vartia weights for UPCs defined in 
appendix B. The CEPI is a relative price, where the numerator is the price for a UPC in local 
market and the denominator is the national average price for a UPC.2 The price index is weighted 
by the Sato-Vartia shares for each UPC in local market (Wuc), which captures the importance of 
each UPC locally.3 
The other component of the EPI, the Variety Adjustment (VA) or a measure of variety 
availability is given by the weighted product of variety index of each food group multiplied by 
food group availability index Sc
1
1−σ . The weight for each food group (Wgc) is the same as in 
equation (1) and variety index of each food group is given by 
 
VAgc = Sgc( )
1
1−σ g
a Sbc( )
Wbc
1−σ g
w
b∈Bgc
∏               (2) 
Similarly, Wbc is the Sato and Vartia weight for brand-product b in local market c defined in 
appendix B and Bgc is the set of all brand-products belong to food group g in local market c. Food 
is split into three tiers within the nested framework. All food items (UPCs) are, first categorized 
                                                
2 As indicated in equation (1), the price in local market for UPC u is calculated by dividing the total local sales for 
UPC u by the total local quantities sold. Thus if the same UPC is sold in two stores in local market at different 
prices, the local price for the UPC is weighted by the quantities sold in each store. 
3 We include all stores in the local market into the price index calculation to depict the local retail market price that 
consumers face. In the price index, stores have already been weighted differently depending on the price and 
availability of products offered in the store. 
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into different brand-products, and second, categorized into 29 TFP food groups. 4  The 
categorization is illustrated in figure 2. For example, a 6 oz Yoplait Original Yogurt strawberry 
flavor is a UPC or barcode, with specific size and flavor information, which belongs to Yoplait 
Original (brand) Yogurt (product). Then Yoplait Original Yogurt brand-product belongs to the 
whole milk, yogurt and cream food group. The variables σ ,  σ ga ,  σ gw  are the elasticities of 
substitution between food groups, across brand-products of food group g, and within a brand-
product of food group g respectively. The elasticities 
 
σ g
a  and  σ gw  are assumed to be constant for 
each food group g.  
We use national expenditure shares to capture the importance of the availability of different 
UPCs, brand-products and food groups in the variety index. The variable Sbc is the national 
expenditure share spent on the UPCs available in the local market c that fall within a specific 
brand-product category. Suppose there are 10 UPCs of brand-product b available nationally, but 
only 4 of those UPCs are available in the local market. Then the Sbc is calculated by dividing the 
national expenditure on the 4 UPCs of brand-product b by the national expenditure on all 10 
UPCs of that brand-product. Analogously, Sgc is the national expenditure share spent on all 
brand-products within a specific food group that are available in the local market c. The variable 
Sc is the national expenditure share on the food groups available in the local market. The detailed 
equations used to calculate national expenditure shares Sbc, Sgc and Sc are provided in appendix B. 
The variety-adjusted price index, EPIc in the local market c is the product of CEPIc and VAc:  
 
EPIc = Sc
1
1−σ CEPIgcVAgc⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
g∈Gc
∏
Wgc = CEPIgc⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
g∈Gc
∏
Wgc VAgc⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
g∈Gc
∏
Wgc⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
Sc
1
1−σ = CEPIcVAc   (3) 
                                                
4 We categorize UPCs into different TFP groups rather than product groups as in Handbury and Weinstein (2014) 
because TFP nesting facilitates comparisons of price and variety differentials across nutritional categories. TFP 
nesting allows more meaningful comparison for within vs. between-variety comparison from a nutrition policy 
perspective when the groups are food groups recognized as key components of a balanced diet as opposed to 
arbitrary food groups selected for commercial purposes (product groups).  
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The CEPIc can be thought of as the correct way to measure the price level of the census tract 
if all UPCs are available in the local market. Since some local markets do not have all UPCs, 
brands, or food groups, we need to adjust the price index by the Variety Adjustment (VAc). The 
variety adjustment consists of three availability indices. The UPC availability index of a census 
tract is given by Sbc( )
Wbc
1−σ gw
b∈Bgc
∏  where variable Sbc provides a utility-adjusted count of missing UPCs 
in the local market c and the exponent weights the counts by how substitutable UPCs are (
 
σ g
w ) 
and how important UPCs are in consumers’ demand in the local market (Wbc).  
The UPC availability index implies that if the local market misses a UPC with a large 
national expenditure share (Sbc), then the missing UPC is important in utility, and the VA and 
EPI will be higher. If the missing UPC is highly substitutable with other UPCs, then missing the 
UPC will not greatly affect the VA. The availability of a specific UPC in a census tract, for 
example, a 16 oz jar of Jif creamy peanut butter, will depend on the importance of this particular 
UPC and its substitutability towards other peanut butter UPCs that exist in the local market. If 
several important items in a food group are missing in a local market and hardly substitutable 
with existing items, then the EPI of that local market will be higher.  
Similarly, the brand-product and food group availability indices ( Sgc
1
1−σ ga and Sc
1
1−σ  ) depend on 
the national expenditure shares of the brand-product and food group, (Sgc and Sc), and whether the 
brand-product and food group have close substitutes (σ ga  and σ ). The more goods available in the 
local market, the lower the VA, and the closer the EPI is to the CEPI. Because one might believe 
that the lack of availability of whole food groups is a larger concern than the lack of a brand-
products within a food group, we divide the VA into two components, namely VA1 and VA2, 
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that capture the across and within food group variety availability, respectively. The detailed 
expressions for VA1 and VA2 are provided in appendix B.  
After constructing the local market price indices, we compare the CEPI, VA and EPI based 
on the following model:  
 
yij =α0 +α1LAij + xijβ +C j + ε ij     (4) 
where yij  is the log of CEPI, VA or EPI for local market i in county j. The indicator variable LAij 
take the value of one if the local market i in county j is a low-access area. The precise definition 
of low-access area is given in the data section. We also include observable demand side factors 
xij i.e. income, poverty rate, population density, education, gender, marital status, age and racial 
composition. In addition, we include county fixed effects (Cj) to control for county-specific 
demand shocks. The regression analysis allows us to study how stores’ pricing behavior varies 
across neighborhoods with observably equivalent demand. 
1.3 Data 
We use Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) retailer scanner data (IRI InfoScan) from 15,722 
stores in 10,367 census tracts in 2012 in the United States to construct the census tract level 
CEPI, VA and EPI. The IRI InfoScan data are provided as a part of 2012 USDA National 
Household Food Acquisition and Purchases Survey (FoodAPS) and cover stores in the fifty 
Primary Sampling Units (PSUs).5 In the context of this study, a PSU is defined as a group of 
adjacent sample counties (or, in some instances, individual counties) that are randomly selected 
from all counties in the U.S. According to Abadie et al. (2016), when data sampling is clustered, 
it is better to cluster standard errors at the sampling unit. Therefore we cluster all standard errors 
                                                
5 The counties in the FoodAPS are nationally representative in terms of the number of SNAP households and non-
SNAP households from three income groups: below 100 percent of the poverty threshold; between 100 and 184 
percent of the poverty threshold, and equal to or greater than 185 percent of the poverty threshold. 
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at the PSU level when regressions analyses are performed. The IRI InfoScan provides weekly 
barcode level sales and quantity sold at each store or regional market area (RMA).6,7,8 The data 
cover almost all major national and regional chain stores in the 84 sample counties.9 We 
aggregate the IRI InfoScan data to an annual level, and calculate the national and local 
expenditure shares and prices subsequently as the building blocks for the price indices. 
We define consumers’ local market as their own and contiguous census tracts. The 
contiguous census tracts are those that share any boundary points with the census tract of 
interest. Based on FoodAPS data, households’ average distance to the primary food store is 1.94 
miles which is within the average radius of the contiguous census tracts (2.24 miles). Therefore, 
we use own and contiguous census tracts as households’ primary shopping areas. 
We categorize each UPC into different TFP food groups and brand-products within a TFP 
food group based on the product descriptions of UPCs. The TFP assigns weekly recommended 
consumption quantities of each food category for fifteen age and gender groups based on the 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans and the My Pyramid Food Guidance System. The TFP is used 
to estimate the cost of a nutritious but cheap or “thrifty” diet and serves as the basis for the 
maximum Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) monthly benefit. A full list of 
TFP categories and the weekly recommended pounds for a male aged 19 to 50 are provided in 
                                                
6 We include both random-weight food items (usually fresh produce) that have a pseudo UPC and non-random-
weight food items (standardized food items) that have a unique UPC.  
7 Some store chains only provide weekly sales data at the RMA level. The RMAs of a store chain are aggregate 
geographical areas defined by the retailer and usually include several stores. Thus the individual prices paid for a 
UPC cannot be identified at each store within a RMA. Therefore, we use the average price for the whole RMA to 
impute for each store and assume that if a UPC is sold in the RMA, then all stores in the RMA also sell that UPC at 
the same price.  
8 Private label information is only available for retailers that have individual store sales. The private label 
information is unavailable for RMA stores.  
9 The covered stores include stores of various types, i.e. merchandise stores, drug stores, convenience stores, dollar 
stores, grocery stores and club stores. One drawback is that local independent stores and farmers’ market are not 
included. However, the IRI states that around 80% of nationwide food at home expenditure is spent in stores 
covered by the IRI.  
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appendix table C. Because one TFP food group overlaps with several food groups from 
Handbury and Weinstein (2014), we use the average of σ ga  and σ gw from the overlapping food 
groups in Handbury and Weinstein (2014) to estimate the elasticities of substitution within and 
across brand-products (σ gw and σ ga ) for each TFP food group.  
After constructing the local TFP EPI, we generate our main explanatory variable of interest, 
the food deserts indicator, defined as a low-income low-access census tract (USDA 2013). A 
low-income census tract is defined as one that has either a poverty rate of 20 percent or higher, 
or a median family income at or below 80 percent of the area’s median family income.  
What constitutes access is debated in the food deserts literature. We define low-access 
census tracts as those with at least 500 people and/or 33 percent of the population residing more 
than one mile from a supermarket10 in urban areas, where a supermarket is a store that has over 2 
million annual sales and has all major food departments including fresh produce, fresh meat and 
poultry, dairy, dry and packaged foods and frozen foods. We use this definition for two reasons. 
First, this definition is commonly used in the literature (e.g. Thomsen et al. 2015; Taylor and 
Villas-Boas 2016) and allows us to compare our results to existing studies. Second, this 
definition is used for policy targeting. For example, the Federal Healthy Food Financing 
Initiative uses this definition to qualify projects expanding access to nutritious food in a food 
desert.  
To define food deserts, we use access and income variables from USDA FoodAPS 
Geography Component (FoodAPS-GC) that are based on store lists from the 2012 TDLinx and 
STARS and income data from the 2008-2012 American Community Survey (ACS). We obtain 
other explanatory variables from the 2008-2012 ACS, i.e. family median income, poverty rate, 
                                                
10 The distance from a household to the nearest supermarket is measured by the distance from the centroid of the 
block groups where the household resides to the nearest supermarket and aggregates to the census tract level.  
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race, gender, marital status, age, education and population density.11 Marital status and education 
are measured by the proportions of people who are married and have completed high school in 
the census tract and contiguous census tracts respectively. We also include the proportions of 
males, children (age<18), elderly (age>=65), white, Hispanic, African American and Asians in 
the census tract and contiguous census tracts. We use socioeconomic variables in resident and 
contiguous census tracts combined to allow for a flexible measure of local demand that accounts 
for the fact that households shop outside their census tract of residence into contiguous census 
tracts. 
Next, we construct the average and median TFP cost by first calculating the average and 
median prices for each food group and use the county-level average and median prices to impute 
the prices of the missing food groups, where the average is the total expenditure divided by total 
pounds spent on the food group.12 Then we multiply the average and median price of each food 
group with the recommended pounds of consumption per week to get the average/median TFP 
cost. One key problem with the average or median TFP cost is that we need to impute the price 
of a missing food group in a census tract. Theoretically the price for that missing product is 
infinitely large if no substitutes are available. This is one of the empirical challenges and 
motivations for the use of EPI, which employs economic theory to capture the effect of those 
missing food groups on overall prices. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the sample by income and access to supermarkets. 
All variables in table 1 are calculated based on data both within the census tracts and contiguous 
census tracts. Out of the 84 sample counties, 63 counties have all four types of census tracts and 
food deserts census tracts are usually spatially clustered in a county. Because a low-access 
                                                
11 We use 2008-2012 ACS for our socioeconomic variables to be consistent with our food deserts variables that are 
in part based on 2008-2012 ACS.  
12 There are 7438, 1810, 551 and 603 census tracts missing one, two, three and over three TFP food groups.  
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census tract is one where over 33% or 500 people are over one mile away from the nearest 
supermarket, it is possible that a high-access census tract does not have a supermarket within 
itself or its contiguous census tracts if for example the census tract itself is very small. For 
similar reasons, a food desert can have supermarkets if the census tract is large and many people 
live in spots of the census tract that are far away from a supermarket. Nevertheless, as expected, 
we find that food deserts are less likely to have supermarkets than all types of non-food deserts 
on average.  
With respect to socioeconomic variables, food deserts have more unmarried, younger, less 
educated people and more African Americans and Hispanics compared to High-Income Low-
Access (HILA) and High-Income High-Access (HIHA) tracts. Low-Income High-Access 
(LIHA) tracts are more similar to food deserts across socioeconomic characteristics. These 
differences in demographic composition in census tracts imply that to study how stores’ pricing 
behavior differ across neighborhoods, we need to control for socioeconomic characteristics that 
may affect preferences and demand. 
1.4 Results  
1.4.1 Main Results 
To compare the price indices between food deserts and non-deserts, we regress log of CEPI, 
VA and EPI against indicator variables for LIHA, HILA and HIHA census tracts. We find that 
the prices of food commonly available in both food deserts and non-food deserts (CEPI) such as 
cheese, sweets and coffee are similar between food deserts, LIHA and HILA tracts. When 
comparing food availability, in table 1 we find that food deserts and non-food deserts have 
similar number of TFP food groups available but food deserts have almost 10,000 fewer UPCs 
than both HILA and HIHA tracts. However, these measures of variety availability do not account 
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for the substitutability between food items or different importance of each food item in the 
consumer basket. After addressing both issues, we find the VA in food deserts is 1.1% lower in 
food deserts than LIHA tracts but 4.3% higher than HILA tracts in table 2, with a higher VA 
indicating lower access to variety. Specifically, the major difference in varieties between HILA 
and food deserts comes from differences in within food group availability (VA2). Therefore, the 
variety-adjusted prices (EPI) are slightly lower (2.6%) in food deserts than LIHA tracts but 3.1% 
higher than HILA tracts in table 2. The raw averages comparison in table 2 gives us two key 
messages. First, the welfare impact of living in a food desert in terms of purchasing groceries 
seems to be small on average, as supported by the fact that the differences in food cost between 
food deserts and non-food deserts are less than 4%. Second, as the price difference between food 
deserts and HILA tracts (income effects) is higher than that between food deserts and LIHA 
tracts (access effect), income matters more for the variety-adjusted prices than access before 
controlling for other demand factors.  
In comparison, we find that in table 1 the average and median TFP costs are actually lower 
in food deserts than all types of non-food deserts tracts.13 For example, the average and median 
TFP costs are 6% and 6.4% higher in LIHA compared to food deserts as shown in table 2. This 
result may be caused by the fact that food deserts sell more lower-quality varieties of foods and 
thus prices are lower compared to non-food deserts. Hence, if ignored, product heterogeneity and 
variety bias may mask a great deal of information in price comparisons, demonstrating the value 
of addressing both product heterogeneity and variety bias. 
                                                
13 Notably, the average TFP cost is much lower than median TFP cost across all types of census tracts. It is because 
the average price for a TFP food group is calculated based on the total expenditure divided by total quantity sold, 
and is essentially an expenditure-weighted average price. If consumers spend most of their food expenditure on the 
cheaper items than more expensive items within a TFP group, then the cheaper items will have a larger weight in the 
average price than in the median price, resulting in a lower average price than the median price. 
 
 
16 
We find that consumers who may be limited in their shopping area face much higher prices 
in food deserts compared to those who can access stores in neighboring census tracts. Table 3 
shows regression results of log EPI on LIHA, HILA and HIHA tract dummy variables, excluding 
stores in contiguous census tracts. This analysis allows us to assess the food prices faced by 
consumers who are constrained to shop within stores in their census tracts, such as older adults 
with limited mobility or individuals that lack access to vehicles or public transportation. We find 
that those consumers in LA tracts face 9.2% higher prices than HA tracts.  
Differences in the EPI may be due to differences in demand, supply/cost factors or both. 
Therefore, we control for observable demand factors and test whether food prices are still lower 
in low access areas when characteristics influencing demand are observably similar. Specifically, 
we regress log of CEPI, VA and EPI against a low access dummy variable along with 
socioeconomic variables and county fixed effects that affect demand. Here income variables are 
census tract family median income, which are continuous variables to better control for local 
demand factors.  
We have three central findings from table 4. First, the difference in EPI between low and 
high access tracts is only 3.5%, which is still small in magnitude. The majority of the small price 
difference comes from lower access to variety, particularly varieties of food items and brand-
products within a food group (VA2), in low access tracts compared to high access tracts.  
Second, the EPI is higher in low access tracts after isolating observable demand factors. The 
reversal in the sign from the simple averages to the regression results suggests that the access 
effect in the simple averages (table 2) captures some of the income/demand effect. To compare 
the importance of different regressors, we calculate the standardized coefficients by scaling each 
regressor coefficient through multiplication with the Standard Deviation (SD) of the regressor 
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divided by the SD of dependent variable (Kim and Fefree 1981). When comparing the 
standardized coefficients, we find that income is more important than access in associations with 
EPI, with standardized coefficients on tract median family income, poverty rate and access of 
0.107, 0.149 and 0.102 respectively. Interestingly, we find a significant racial disparity in EPI, 
where census tracts with high proportions of African-Americans face significantly higher EPI, 
with standardized coefficient as high as 0.195. Furthermore, tracts with more higher educated 
people face significantly lower EPI, with the lowest standardized coefficient of -0.161. Thus, we 
find significant racial and educational disparity exist in terms of facing higher food prices. These 
large coefficients on demographic characteristics compared to coefficients on access provide 
suggestive evidence that demand is lower in food deserts, which translates into lower food prices 
as found in comparisons of raw averages.  
Third, even though few large grocery stores exist in food deserts, we see little evidence of 
stores exhibiting market power. When demand is observably similar, stores charge only slightly 
higher prices in low access areas where they face little local competition. In addition, we find 
from FoodAPS data that the average food desert household travels as far as 2.6 miles to their 
primary grocery store, and over 95% of the households choose cheap supermarkets as their 
primary store type, which moderates the effect of local supply conditions and may contribute to 
the small market power of local stores. 
To check whether the difference in EPI is driven by the existence of nearby supermarkets, 
we compare the prices only for the census tracts with supermarkets in the local market and those 
without supermarkets in the local market in table 5. We find that CEPI, VA, EPI are similar in 
low access and high access tracts when both have only small stores around or when both have 
supermarkets in the local market. Thus, the higher EPI in low access tracts found in table 4 
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largely comes from those low access tracts without a supermarket nearby vs. high access tracts 
with a supermarket nearby. These results suggest that neither supermarkets nor non-supermarkets 
charge higher EPI in low access tracts compared to high access counterparts. But low access 
tracts are less likely to have supermarkets which, in turn, have higher VA than non-supermarkets. 
In sum, the lack of supermarkets leads to higher EPI in low access tracts than high access 
counterparts.14 Nevertheless, given the difference in EPI between low and high access tracts is 
only 3.5% on average, encouraging supermarkets entry into food deserts may have limited 
effects of lowering food prices and improving healthy eating. 
Lastly, we test to see if higher prices are driven by higher prices of goods in convenience 
stores in table 6. We calculate and compare the EPI for the six most commonly available TFP 
food groups15, which are available in both traditional grocery stores and convenience stores. 
Results show that even after accounting for different access to variety, the EPI of commonly 
available food groups in low access tracts is almost the same as high access tracts. Thus, we find 
our results do not merely reflect higher prices for processed foods in convenience stores in food 
deserts; instead they reflect higher prices in items that are not generally found in convenience 
stores such as fruits and vegetables, which supports that food deserts have both higher prices and 
lower availability of healthy foods. 
1.4.2 Robustness Tests 
We conduct five robustness tests and the results are shown in appendix D. All robustness 
tests results are consistent with our main findings. First, we demonstrate results without county 
                                                
14 We recognize that the prices consumers pay are related to store/brand searching ability (Binkley 2013). In this 
article, we focus on the exogenous prices consumers face (i.e. stores pricing behavior) and leave how store/brand 
search behavior affects the extent to which consumers benefit from lower prices due to availability for future 
research.  
15 The six TFP food groups are “non-whole grain breads, cereal, rice, pasta, pies, pastries, snacks, and flours”, “fruit 
juice”, “all cheese, including cheese soups and sauces”, “nuts, nut butters, and seeds”, “coffee and tea” and “sugars, 
sweets, and candies”. 
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fixed effects in appendix table D1. Second, one may be concerned that using the average 
elasticities of substitution in overlapping Handbury and Weinstein (2014) food groups 
overestimate the degree of substitutability within a TFP food group.16 Thus we test the robustness 
of our results against other estimates of elasticities of substitution in appendix table D2. 
Specifically, we use 4 and 7 as the across and within brand elasticities of substitution, which are 
commonly used in marketing literature (Dube and Manchanda 2005).  
Third, one may be concerned that we cannot compare the same UPCs for the random-weight 
items, especially something like produce, which arguably hinders our ability to adjust for product 
heterogeneity. Thus we test the veracity of our results when random-weight items are excluded 
in appendix table D3.  
Fourth, one may wonder that census tract plus the contiguous census tract may not be the 
correct spatial unit to describe the retail environment. Thus we test the robustness of our results 
using a more general area surrounding a census tract as consumers’ shopping area. Appendix 
table D4 provides the results when we allow consumers to shop within a two-mile buffer zone of 
the resident census tract, where 2 mile is the 75 percentile of the distance to a primary grocery 
store from the FoodAPS data. The EPI difference between low and high access census tracts 
becomes even smaller when the two-mile definition of local market is used.  
Lastly, in appendix table D5, we study the store coverage of IRI data compared with TDLinx, 
the most complete list of food stores at the census-tract level in the U.S. and is widely used by 
the industry to analyze the regional retail market. We find that at the census tract level, on 
average IRI covers over 90% of club stores, mass merchandisers, dollar stores and drug stores. 
But the coverage of grocery stores (74% and 75% in store counts and sales) and convenience 
                                                
16 If the products within a TFP food group are less substitutable than the elasticity of substitution suggests now, then 
food deserts that miss a lot of UPCs would be penalized more in the EPI calculation and actually have higher EPI 
than what’s currently estimated. Thus our estimates provide a lower bound. 
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stores (53% and 57%) is lower. While we do not anticipate that including more stores would 
have an impact on our substantive conclusions, an expansion of the IRI data set to include more 
stores would help address this issue.  
1.5 Conclusion 
In this article we construct a price index that adjusts for both product heterogeneity and 
variety bias to compare the local cost of a nutritious diet in food deserts versus non-food deserts. 
We find that after controlling for observable demand, the stores charge slightly higher price 
(0.9%) and have lower food availability (2.6%) in low access tracts than in their high access 
counterparts. In combination, the variety-adjusted price index is only 3.5% higher in low access 
areas. The small difference in EPI between food deserts and non-food deserts suggests both 
limited market power of existing stores in food deserts and a relatively small welfare impact of 
living in a food desert, at least for those who can travel to neighboring census tracts to shop. 
Consequently, while higher food prices are associated with higher rates of food insecurity 
(Gregory and Coleman-Jensen 2013; Hasan 2016), our results suggest that living in a food desert 
is unlikely to influence food insecurity to a great extent, at least in as much as substitute foods 
are available. (For more on food insecurity in the United States see Gundersen and Ziliak 2014 
and Gundersen Kreider and Pepper 2011). 
Our results are influenced by how we define the ‘local’ grocery market. For households who 
are constrained to buy food within their resident tracts, the variety-adjusted price index is 9.2% 
higher in low access tracts than high access counterparts. This result implies that those 
households who are constrained to shop within their resident census tracts are much more 
affected by living in a food desert.  
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Our results suggest that when observable demand is equivalent, higher prices in low access 
tracts are driven by the lack of supermarkets. On one hand, the small price difference induced by 
the presence of supermarkets suggests that policies aimed at improving access alone may not be 
effective in lowering food prices or improving diets. On the other hand, we emphasize that 
demand-side factors such as income and poverty rate are important to consider. So efforts to 
increasing the purchasing power in these areas may be worthwhile to pursue. For example, 
increasing benefits and participation rates in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program) may have greater impact on food 
insecurity and dietary outcomes of households in food deserts than food desert policies 
themselves, insofar as SNAP has consistently been demonstrated to increase the purchasing 
power of low-income households (Bartfeld et al., 2015 Ziliak, 2015 and Gundersen et al., 2016). 
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1.6 Tables  
Table 1.1 Summary Statistics  
 Food 
Deserts 
Low Income 
High Access 
High Income 
Low Access 
High Income 
High Access 
Average TFP Cost 58.37 
(16.03) 
62.22 
(18.44) 
59.95 
(13.85) 
61.41 
(13.57) 
Median TFP Cost 97.32 103.73 105.14 108.70 
 (17.61) (18.26) (14.06) (13.41) 
Number of TFP Groups 28.34 
(1.38) 
28.11 
(2.04) 
28.59 
(1.29) 
28.65 
(0.99) 
Number of UPCs 29677.73 
(20078.12) 
27498.86 
(18653.43) 
38856.69 
(19044.73) 
38346.90 
(17784.91) 
VA1 0.89 
(0.02) 
0.90 
(0.19) 
0.89 
(0.03) 
0.89 
(0.02) 
VA2 1.14 
(0.12) 
1.14 
(0.12) 
1.09 
(0.09) 
1.09 
(0.08) 
VA 1.01 
(0.12) 
1.03 
(0.32) 
0.97 
(0.11) 
0.97 
(0.09) 
CEPI 1.02 
(0.06) 
1.04 
(0.06) 
1.04 
(0.05) 
1.05 
(0.05) 
EPI 1.04 
(0.18) 
1.08 
(0.38) 
1.01 
(0.15) 
1.01 
(0.13) 
Having supermarkets 0.70 
(0.46) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.87 
(0.34) 
0.87 
(0.33) 
Population density 
(persons/square mile) 
4,535 
(4,054) 
15,507 
(15,827) 
3,100 
(2,662) 
9,617 
(13,174) 
Married proportion 0.37 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(0.11) 
0.56 
(0.11) 
0.49 
(0.11) 
Poverty rate 
 
Family median income ($) 
0.26 
(0.13) 
42,715 
(14,364) 
0.27 
(0.12) 
42,532 
(14,773) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
102,402 
(40,442) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
92,839 
(33,301) 
Children proportion (age<18) 
 
Elderly proportion (age>=65) 
0.26 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.26 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
0.23 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.09) 
0.21 
(0.06) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
High school graduates 
proportion 
0.75 
(0.14) 
0.70 
(0.15) 
0.93 
(0.06) 
0.90 
(0.08) 
Male proportion 0.49 
(0.05) 
0.49 
(0.05) 
0.49 
(0.03) 
0.49 
(0.04) 
African American proportion 0.26 
(0.28) 
0.21 
(0.29) 
0.07 
(0.14) 
0.09 
(0.16) 
White proportion 0.31 
(0.30) 
0.23 
(0.22) 
0.68 
(0.26) 
0.52 
(0.28) 
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Table 1.1 (cont.) 
 
Hispanic proportion 0.31 
(0.24) 
0.35 
(0.22) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
Asian proportion 0.03 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
Obs. 923 3,468 2,113 3,863 
Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. Food deserts are defined as low-income urban 
census tracts where at least 33% or 500 people live over 1 mile away from supermarkets. 
 
Table 1.2 Regressions on EPI Without Control Variables 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log VA1 Log VA2 Log EPI Log 
Average 
TFP 
Cost 
Log 
Median 
TFP 
Cost 
LIHA 0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.060** 
(0.029) 
0.064*** 
(0.018) 
HILA 0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.043*** 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.083*** 
(0.012) 
HIHA 0.021*** 
(0.002) 
-0.044*** 
(0.004) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.064* 
(0.035) 
0.118*** 
(0.018) 
Obs. 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 1.3 Regressions on EPI–Without Contiguous Census Tracts Sales 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log VA1 Log VA2 Log EPI Log 
Average 
TFP 
Cost 
Log 
Median 
TFP 
Cost 
LIHA -0.007** 
(0.004) 
-0.085*** 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.801*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.015) 
0.061 
(0.054) 
0.004 
(0.052) 
HILA 0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.097*** 
(0.014) 
0.0001 
(0.008) 
-0.097*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.016) 
0.148** 
(0.059) 
0.058 
(0.064) 
HIHA 0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.156*** 
(0.013) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.145*** 
(0.009) 
-0.155*** 
(0.015) 
0.215*** 
(0.068) 
0.088 
(0.073) 
Obs. 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. 
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Table 1.4 Regressions on EPI–With Contiguous Census Tracts Sales 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log VA1 Log VA2 Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.026*** 
(0.005) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.005) 
Log Tract Median Family 
Income 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Poverty Rate 0.086*** 
(0.017) 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.092*** 
(0.022) 
0.175*** 
(0.036) 
Population Density 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
Married Share -0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.043 
(0.029) 
Children Share -0.034** 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.034) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
-0.023 
(0.042) 
Elderly Share 0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.019) 
High School Share 0.025 
(0.019) 
-0.183*** 
(0.025) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.135*** 
(0.014) 
-0.159*** 
(0.020) 
Male Share 0.008 
(0.014) 
0.031 
(0.031) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.026) 
0.039 
(0.042) 
African American Share 0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.097*** 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
0.097*** 
(0.020) 
0.124*** 
(0.028) 
White Share 0.037*** 
(0.012) 
0.037 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
0.074** 
(0.031) 
Asian Share 0.027 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.037) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
0.026 
(0.023) 
0.044 
(0.048) 
Hispanic Share 0.025 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.035) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.033 
(0.040) 
Obs. 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 10,367 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. County fixed effects are also 
included. 
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Table 1.5 Regressions on EPI–How much difference do supermarkets make? 
 
 With Supermarkets Without Supermarkets 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food 
Access 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
Log Family 
Income 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.022*** 
(0.006) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
Poverty Rate 0.079*** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.110*** 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.036) 
Obs. 8,213 8,213 8,213 2,154 2,154 2,154 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are included. Log family income is log tract median family income. 
 
 
Table 1.6 Regressions on EPI–Commonly Available Foods 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
Log Family Income 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Poverty Rate 0.032*** 
(0.007) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.055*** 
(0.012) 
Obs. 10,367 10,367 10,367 
 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are also included. Log family income is log tract median family income. 
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1.7 Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Categories of Foods 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Categories of Foods 
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CHAPTER 2: Access to Fruits and Vegetables and Consumer Welfare in Urban Food 
Deserts 
 
Abstract 
Low access to food retailers in poor communities, or the so-called food deserts is associated with 
unhealthy eating and diet-related health problems. Government agencies have implemented 
various policies to expand access to fruits and vegetables in these food deserts. One concern with 
the effectiveness of these policies is that they assume demand for food stores is similar across 
food deserts and non-food deserts. In this paper, I provide empirical evidence that this 
assumption is not verified in practice, and I quantify key welfare implications of this fact. I 
estimate the effect of expanding food access for consumers living in food deserts allowing for 
differences in demand. I use detailed, geocoded, store sales and consumer demographic data to 
(1) estimate a discrete choice demand system for food stores with consumer heterogeneity, (2) 
quantify the welfare impact of expanding access to fruits and vegetables in food deserts, (3) 
compare this effect to that of a subsidy to fruits and vegetables prices in food deserts, and (4) 
simulate the welfare change of a food desert household facing non-food-desert levels of prices 
and store characteristics, and vice-versa. I find prices are more important to consumers than the 
availability of fruits and vegetables and store proximity. Expanding the availability of fruits and 
vegetables in the nearest stores of food deserts does not greatly change consumers’ store choices 
or enhance consumer welfare. In contrast, price subsidy programs have the potential to 
significantly improve consumer welfare in food deserts.  
Keywords: Discrete choice models, spatial differentiation, food deserts, food access, fruits and 
vegetables, consumer welfare 
 
JEL Codes: Q18, I31, D12 
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2.1 Introduction 
Households living in low-income neighborhoods often face limited access to healthy foods and 
higher food prices (Fan et al. 2017). In addition, low access to healthy foods is assumed to 
contribute to poor diets and higher levels of obesity and other diet-related diseases, such as 
diabetes and heart disease (Ahern, Brown and Duka 2011; Morland, Wing and Diet-Roux 2002; 
Bodor et al. 2008). Therefore, a number of policies aim to improve the access to healthy foods in 
poor communities: for example, the US Healthy Food Financing Initiative authorized by 2014 
Farm Bill allocates $125 million annually in grants, loan subsidies, and technical assistance for 
healthy food retailers in food deserts, defined as geographic areas with low-income and low food 
access (Aussenberg 2014). Furthermore, projects aimed at “eliminating food deserts" are eligible 
for the $100 million in Community Transformation Grants under the Affordable Care Act (HHS 
2011). Former First Lady Michelle Obama’s signature initiative Let’s Move features building 
healthy communities and targets eliminating food deserts in the U.S.. However, many studies 
have found little effect of food access on consumer behavior (Currie et al. 2010; Anderson and 
Matsa 2011; Handbury, Rahkovsky and Schnell 2016; Allcott, Diamond and Dube 2017). In this 
paper, I estimate the welfare effect of policies directed at improving food access in food deserts. 
Although policy-makers have implemented various initiatives to eradicate food deserts, it is 
unclear whether such policies change consumer choices and improve household welfare. 
Evaluating the welfare impact of these interventions is challenging. The interventions are not 
randomly assigned or exogenously determined. Thus it is hard to separate the effect of improving 
food access from other unobserved socioeconomic factors that determine the timing and the 
placement of these initiatives. Existing literature on the effect of food access on food purchases 
largely infer the role of food environment from a cross-sectional correlation between store 
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density and food purchases (Cummins et al. 2005, Bodor et al. 2008, Sharkey et al. 2010). More 
recently, Handbury, Rahkovsky and Schnell (2016) use household fixed effects to control for 
time-invariant demand factors that may affect store access. They find that spatial disparities in 
access play a limited role in generating socioeconomic disparities in nutritional consumption. 
However, while comparing purchases of the same household over time removes correlation 
between access and time-invariant components of household demand, changes in access may be 
correlated with unobserved changes in household tastes. As a result of this endogeneity, the 
estimated effect of access may be biased.  
Allcott, Diamond and Dube (2017) use a similar structural model in Dubois, Griffith, and 
Nevo (2014) to estimate consumers’ demand for food categories and macronutrients jointly, to 
study why lower income households have less healthful diets, called nutrition-income disparities. 
They find that food availability and prices explain 9% and demand explain around 91% of 
nutrition-income disparities. However, they assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
utility model that automatically imposes the price elasticities of calories consumption to be one 
for all households. Thus prices subsidies will automatically have small impact in reducing the 
nutrition-income disparities because low- and high-income households have the same pre-
imposed small price effect on food consumption. In this paper I relax this assumption and allow 
consumers to have different price elasticities depending on their income and unobserved 
characteristics. In contrast to Allcott, Diamond and Dube (2017), I find that price subsidies are 
useful policies to increase consumer welfare as well as improve fruits and vegetables purchases. 
In this article, I use a discrete choice model to estimate structural consumer demand for 
different types of food stores and identify the welfare impact of improving access to fruits and 
vegetables in food deserts. I explicitly model consumer demand with heterogeneous preferences 
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and spatial differentiation of stores. If the existence of food deserts is caused by lower demand 
for access to healthy foods, then improving food access alone will not be effective in changing 
consumer behavior. Thus to determine the degree to which access affects consumer choice, it is 
important to allow consumers in food deserts and non-food deserts to have different demand for 
store characteristics. After estimating consumers’ demand and preferences, I perform 
counterfactual analyses to study the impact of intervention policies in food deserts on consumer 
welfare ex ante. Although the impact of such interventions on health cannot be measured, 
consumer welfare analysis gives us insight into the potential effect of these types of policy 
intervention on other quality of life measures such as travel cost. 
I use a panel of quantities and prices for 174 food stores from 11 randomly chosen mid-sized 
counties over a period of 16 quarters (2009-2012), collected using scanning devices from 
Information Resources Inc. (IRI). Store characteristics come from Nielsen TDLinx store 
directory data and census-tract level socio-demographics from 2008-2012 American Community 
Survey (ACS). The census-tract level food deserts indicators are from 2010 USDA Food Access 
Research Atlas (FARA, USDA 2013). 
 I estimate consumer demand for food stores in each census tract in a county using a 
random-coefficient discrete choice model (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes or BLP 1995; Nevo 
2001). The indirect utility of the consumer is a function of store prices, store characteristics, 
heterogeneous consumer preferences, and unknown parameters. The store characteristics include 
the number of fruits and vegetables offered, store square footage, store chain dummies and the 
distance to consumer’s home. The BLP model allows the consumer’s valuation of store 
proximity to home to vary with whether the consumer owns a car and unobserved consumer 
characteristics. Furthermore, this model allows consumers with different incomes to have 
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differential preferences towards store characteristics and prices. The correlation between prices, 
availability of fruits and vegetables and unobserved demand shocks, which are included in the 
error term, makes prices and availability of fruits and vegetables potentially endogenous in the 
demand estimation. To address this concern, I use observed variation in store-specific cost 
shifters such as the store’s distance to the nearest distribution center and quarterly regional fruits 
wholesale prices as the instrumental variables for store prices and the number of fruits and 
vegetables.  
After obtaining the demand parameters, I conduct three counterfactual analyses. First, I 
simulate the effect of increasing the number of fruits and vegetables to average levels as Family 
Dollar, Kmart, CVS Pharmacy, Fred Meyer and Safeway, in the nearest store of each food desert 
census tract. The average levels of fruits and vegetables are 50, 100, 25017, 350 and 1,200 UPCs 
in the five store chains mentioned above. Second, I compare these results to an alternative policy 
that lowers the price of fruits and vegetables in the nearest store of each food desert census tract, 
by 1%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 30%. Third, the welfare change from the scenario of a food desert 
(non-food desert) household facing the prices and store characteristics in a non-food desert (food 
desert) is simulated to study the extent to which demand differs between food deserts and non-
food deserts. 
My central findings are as follows. First, price is the most important factor that affects 
choice of stores for both food desert and non-food desert consumers. Consumers prefer stores 
with lower prices much more than the availability of fruits and vegetables and store proximity. 
Second, expanding access to fruits and vegetables in food deserts increases total consumer 
welfare in an average county by $886,968 to $2,117,851 in 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars, when the 
                                                
17 The fruits and vegetables provided in CVS Pharmacy are mostly different sizes of canned fruits and vegetables.  
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number of fruits and vegetables are increased to 50 and 100, over 20 years of operation with 
discounting. The estimated benefit is less than the cost of policy interventions in part because 
food desert residents have lower preferences for proximity to fruits and vegetables. Third, FV 
price subsidies are much more effective in improving consumer welfare. A 10% fruits and 
vegetables price reduction generates an increase in consumer welfare by $51 per household per 
year while the cost of the program is only $25 per household per year. Importantly, this policy 
has better targeting and distributional effects, i.e. it benefits food deserts households more than 
non-food deserts households. Last, I find that even when a food desert household faces the 
exactly same store attributes and prices as a non-food desert household, their welfare increases 
by a modest amount (9.9%) on average. In contrast, a household who moves from a non-food 
desert to a food desert would experience a three-fold larger welfare impact; a sharp decrease of 
31.5% in their welfare. In short, food desert households have lower demand for good access to 
fruits and vegetables (FV) compared to non-food desert households, which may be one reason 
why supermarkets do not locate in food deserts. 
This article is related to several strands in the literature. The first is the literature that studies 
the impact of improving food access on food choices. My results for food consumed at home are 
qualitatively consistent with earlier empirical studies that find access to fast food restaurants has 
little effect on food consumption and obesity (Anderson and Matsa (2011), Currie et al. (2010), 
Davis and Carpenter (2009) and Dunn (2010)).  Recent studies on access to grocery stores have 
mixed findings. On one hand, some studies find that limited food access is associated with 
increased incidence of obesity, less healthy grocery purchases (Caillavet et al. 2015; Thomsen et 
al. 2015) and lower food security (Bonnano and Li 2015). Other work finds that the expansion of 
supercenters such as Wal-Mart lower the prices of unhealthy foods more than healthy foods, thus 
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reducing rather than improving the healthfulness of food purchases and increasing obesity 
(Courtemanche and Carden 2011; Volpe, Okrent and Leibtag 2013). Recent work finds that 
supermarket entry has limited effects on the healthfulness of food purchases or dietary choices 
(Cummins, Flint and Matthews 2014; Handbury, Rahkovsky, and Schnell 2016; Allcott, 
Diamond, and Dube 2017). This article contributes to the literature by distinguishing the roles of 
preferences, store attributes and prices play in consumers’ store choices, and thus identifying 
why and how improving access to fruits and vegetables in food deserts affects welfare. To the 
best of my knowledge, this paper conducts the first cost-benefit analyses of intervention 
programs to eliminate food deserts.  
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on food store choice. Existing literature (e.g. 
Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983; Smith 2004; Smith 2006; Hausman and Leibtag 2007; Briesch, 
Chintagunta, and Fox 2009; Richards, Hamilton and Yonezawa 2016; Marshall and Pires 2017; 
Chenarides and Jaenicke 2017) demonstrates that consumers choose food stores based on a 
variety of factors including overall prices, product variety, store type, location, convenience, 
courteous services and the degree of competition. Taylor and Villas-Boas (2016) estimate 
consumer food outlet choices as a function of outlet type, store distances to home and household 
attributes. They find heterogeneous willingness to pay (WTP) for distances to different types of 
stores. My paper complements Taylor and Villas-Boas (2016) by quantifying the welfare impact 
of policy interventions aimed at improving FV access by reducing the distance to stores with 
plenty of FV. 
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The findings have substantial implications for food policy. Given the estimated small 
benefits to the community18, a policy aimed at increasing the availability of just a few FV in food 
deserts without lowering prices may not be as effective. In contrast, FV price subsidies seem to 
be a more plausible way to change consumer behavior and improve consumer welfare. 
Furthermore, my results inform the question of why food deserts exist, suggesting low income 
and preferences for proximity to FV may be one factor that contributes to the existence of food 
deserts. Thus policies affecting underlying factors driving preferences and increasing income 
could perhaps enhance consumer demand and welfare.  
2.2 Discrete Choice Demand 
This section presents a standard BLP model of discrete choice demand with heterogeneous 
customers. The preferences for store attributes and prices are allowed to differ at the consumer 
level. Thus the existence of food deserts could be caused by the heterogeneity in preferences. 
The model allows for several sources of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers with 
different income levels could have different price sensitivity and valuation of FV availability. 
Second, vehicle access affects consumers’ preferences for store proximity. Third, unobserved 
consumer characteristics are allowed to influence valuation of all store attributes and prices. 
Demand can be summarized as follows: consumer19 in census tract i (called consumer i 
hereafter) derives indirect utility from buying food in store j at time t (a quarter-county 
combination):  
 
uijt = δ jt + µijt + ε ijt        
                                                
18 The benefits measured in this article are just in terms of consumer welfare for food purchases, not in terms of 
taxes collected (sales/property), increased development/employment or any other benefits of having better retail 
environment in an area. 
19 In this article, a consumer is a household. Consumer and household are used interchangeably throughout the 
article. 
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The first component,  δ jt , is a store-time specific utility term common to all consumers. The 
 µ ijt term captures heterogeneity in consumer tastes for observed store characteristics. The term 
 ε ijt is a taste term that is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across both stores 
and consumers. Consumer i is assumed to choose the store j that gives maximum utility, and 
market shares yield from aggregating over consumers. 
Specifically, the utility component common to all consumers,  δ jt  and the consumer varying 
utility term µijt are given as 
  δ jt = x jtβ +α pjt + ξ jt         
 
µijt = x jt Γ1Di +Ω1vi( ) + pjt Γ2Di +Ω2vi( ) + dij γ + Γ3Di +Ω3vi( )  
This Lancasterian approach makes the payoff of a consumer depend on store, consumer 
characteristics and model parameters. Consumer’s indirect utility depends on a vector of K 
observable store characteristics xjt, store price pjt, distance from the store to the consumer i’s 
home dij, and unobserved (by the econometrician) store characteristics  ξ jt  
20. The coefficients 
 β ,α ,γ  are consumer’s mean valuation of various store attributes. In addition, consumer’s 
valuation of store attributes is affected by observed consumer demographics Di and unobserved 
consumer characteristics vi, distributed i.i.d. standard normals. Γ  is a matrix of coefficients that 
measures the effect of demographics on the consumer valuation of store characteristics while Ω  
measures the covariance in unobserved preferences across characteristics. 
After integrating over  ε ijt which is assumed to have a type 1 extreme value distribution, Di 
                                                
20 This specification assumes that the unobserved components are common to all consumers. An alternative is to 
model the distribution of valuation of the unobserved characteristics, as in Das, Olley, and Pakes (1994). 
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and vi, the model prediction of market share for store j at time t is given by21: 
  
 
sjt = wi
exp δ jt + µijt (vi , Di )( )
1+ exp δ jk + µikt (vi , Di )( )
k∈Jt
∑
dP(Di )dP(vi )
Dt
∫
vi
∫
i∈It
∑   (1) 
Each census tract is weighted by wi, the population share of the census tract i in the market. S0t 
denotes the market share of the outside option. 
After estimating the demand parameters, the inclusive value (or expected maximized utility) 
is used as the measure of consumer welfare. This measure is defined as 
 
E max
j∈Jt
uijt
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= log 1+ exp α i p jt + x jtβi + dijγ i + ξ jt( )
j∈Jt
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟  
where the measure is expressed in “utils” (McFadden 1973; McFadden 1976; Small and Rosen 
1981). The price coefficient  α i is the negative marginal utility of income in the indirect utility 
function. To express this measure of consumer welfare in “dollars”, I divide the equation by - α i . 
Then a monetary measure of how consumer i’s welfare is affected by a change from xjt to xjt’ is 
defined as 
 
ΔWit =
1
α i
log 1+ exp(α i p jt + x jtβi + dijγ i + ξ jt )
j∈Jt
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
                        − 1
α i
log 1+ exp(α i p jt + x jt
' βi + dijγ i + ξ jt )
j∈Jt
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
                (2) 
where  ΔWit is the change in consumer surplus or compensating variation (CV), the amount that a 
household needs to be compensated/pay when xjt is changed into xjt’ while keeping her utility 
                                                
21 One may be concerned that consumers choose several stores in a week for grocery shopping. Here I assume 
consumers choose one store per store visit. If one is reluctant to accept this assumption, this model can be viewed as 
an approximation to the true choice model. An alternative is to explicitly model the choice of multiple stores as in 
Hendel (1999) or in Thomassen et al. (2017). 	
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intact.  
The consumer i’s WTP for store attribute xjt is captured by the change in consumer welfare 
by a marginal change in xjt :   
 
∂Wit
∂x jt
= Sijt′
βi
α i
                      (3) 
where S’ijt is the new probability of consumer i visiting store j at time t when xjt is changed into 
x’jt. In contrast to previous literature on estimating WTP based on discrete choice models, the 
total WTP should take both the extensive (S’ijt) and intensive margins (
 
βi
α i
) into account. Thus 
changing a store attribute affects consumer welfare both through new valuations of the store 
attribute conditional on visiting the store (
 
βi
α i
) and the new likelihood of visiting the store (S’ijt).  
2.3 Estimation 
My estimation strategy closely resembles the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach 
taken by BLP (1995) and Nevo (2001). One might describe the BLP approach as two parts. The 
first part matches the model’s share predictions,  
sj (δ (θ ),θ ) , to those in the data,  
s j , or 
 
sj (δ (θ ),θ )− sj = 0,       j = 0,1,..., Jt                   (4) 
where θ  are demand parameters. Subscript t for notation simplicity is omitted in the following 
text. This part is equivalent to solving for the vector  δ (θ ) that matches the predicted to the 
observed market shares, which Berry (1994) shows exists and is unique under mild regularity 
conditions on the distribution of consumer tastes.  
The second part matches moments related to the market-level disturbances  ξ j . Except for 
price and number of fruits and vegetables, the unobserved demand disturbances for any store j 
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are assumed to be uncorrelated with observed demand and cost-side variables of the store in that 
county-quarter, or 
 
E Z '⋅ξ j θ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0        Z = X ,W    (5)  
where θ  is the true value of parameters in the demand model. For prices and number of fruits 
and vegetables, two sets of instruments (Z) are available. First, store j’s characteristics (X) are 
valid instruments for the stores. The second set are cost-side variables (W) that are excluded from 
the demand equation. The GMM estimate is 
 
⌢
θ = argminξ(θ )'Z(Z 'Z )−1Z 'ξ(θ )    
Asymptotically robust standard errors for the estimates above are computed using the 
standard formulas (Hansen 1982; Newey and MacFadden 1994). 
2.4 Instruments 
The key identifying assumption in the estimation is the population moment condition, which 
requires a set of exogenous instrumental variables. By the standard oligopoly price competition 
model, prices are a function of marginal costs and a markup term. Players in the industry set 
prices after accounting for store characteristics or demand shocks, either of which may be 
unobserved by the econometrician. Similarly, the number of fruits and vegetables offered in the 
store may react to local demand shocks that are correlated with consumer utility, and thus are 
endogenous. Thus the non-linear least squares regressions may give biased estimates of price 
sensitivity, α  and the coefficient on the number of fruits and vegetables.  
To address the endogeneity, I use store characteristics and cost shifters that are uncorrelated 
with local demand shocks as instruments following much of the previous work (Nevo 2001; 
Petrin 2002). Specifically, I include store square footage as a time-varying store attribute. The 
four cost shifters are (a) the distance to the nearest distribution center, which picks up 
 
 
44 
transportation costs22 (b) the quarterly regional wholesale prices of bananas interacted with 
distance to the nearest distribution center, which is a proxy for wholesale cost of fruits23 (c) 
population density and (d) average housing value per square feet in the store census tract as a 
proxy for the cost of space and land.24  
In addition to the endogeneity of prices and number of fruits and vegetables, distances to 
stores may also be correlated with unobserved local demand. Store location is a choice. Retailers 
take into account local demand to choose where to locate and households consider retail 
amenities in deciding where to live (Ver Ploeg, Mancino and Todd 2015). However, the 
coefficients on distances in the utility model are not estimated based on the orthogonality 
condition between the demand error term and distance (equation 5). Rather they are estimated 
through matching predicted and observed market shares (equation 4) and thus our estimates of 
preferences towards distances still satisfy the moment conditions and are unbiased. 
Furthermore, I strengthen the identification strategy by exploiting the panel structure of the 
data. Store chain fixed effects are used to control for any store chain quality that does not vary by 
market. Therefore, the correlation between prices and the unobserved store chain quality is fully 
accounted for and does not require an instrument. Additionally, county fixed effects are included 
to capture time-invariant county-level unobservables such as regional tastes. For example west 
coast counties may prefer stores with more fruits and vegetables while counties in Texas may 
                                                
22 The store chains studied in this paper are well established and rarely open or close a distribution center according 
to local demand in the study period. I find in the data that over 70% of firms charge different prices for the same 
ketchup UPC among different stores in the same county-week. Given that firms do not set the same price for all 
stores in a market, prices are well correlated with distance to the nearest distribution center.   
23 I also choose quarterly regional wholesale prices of oranges and apples interacted with distances to the nearest 
distribution centers as IVs, and the results do not change substantially. If one is still concerned about the power of 
the IVs for the number of fruits and vegetables, I treat the number of FV as exogenous and find the demand 
estimates do not change much. 
24 One may be concerned that population density and average housing value per square feet also reflect local demand 
that is embedded in the error term of the utility model. I test the robustness of our results by excluding those two as 
IVs and results do not change substantially. 
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prefer stores with better beef. Lastly quarter fixed effects are used to control for national 
temporal and seasonal shocks. Thus the identification of demand parameters comes from the 
substitution patterns between stores belong to the same chain in the same county-quarter. 
2.5 Data 
The data required to estimate the model consist of four sets of variables: store attributes and 
prices in a market (in this article a county-quarter combination), consumer characteristics, food 
deserts indicators, and instrumental variables. 
I focus on 11 randomly selected well-delimited and medium-sized counties including only 
urban census tracts across the United States.25  I focus on those counties because spatial 
differentiation will play a significant role in market structure only if population, or available 
demand, is sufficiently large and geographically spread out for firms to exploit. According to the 
2012 USDA Food Acquisition and Purchases Survey (FoodAPS26), the average customer travels 
only 3.3 miles for a one-way trip to the primary food store. The markets used in this study are 
selected, therefore, to provide adequate scope for spatial differentiation by firms, while not being 
so large that distant competitors would rarely, if ever, compete with each other for customers. 
Rural census tracts are excluded because they are very large in space and are likely self-
contained markets. The population of these counties ranges from 50,000 to 500,000, with two 
counties in the Northeast, two in the Midwest, four in the South, and three in the West. 
Furthermore, food desert is a prominent problem in these counties, where the portion of people 
and the poor live in food deserts are on average 27% and 34% respectively. 
Prices and quantities come from Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) retailer scanner data (IRI 
                                                
25 The model is intractable for more than eleven counties in the confidential data enclave platform provided by the 
USDA. 
26 FoodAPS is a household level food acquisition and purchases survey conducted by the USDA from April 2012 to 
January 2013. FoodAPS records food at and away from home events for a national representative sample of 
households for one week. 
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InfoScan). The IRI InfoScan data provide weekly sales, quantities, brand and the product 
description of each food item27 at the barcode level at each store or regional market area 
(RMA)28.29 The data contains 174 stores from the first quarter of 2009 to the last quarter of 2012 
in the sample counties. Thus the outside option in the utility model is the food stores not included 
in the IRI InfoScan dataset. The number of fruits and vegetables Universal Product Codes 
(UPCs) sold is used as the availability of fruits and vegetables in each store-quarter.30,31 The 
store price is calculated by multiplying the average UPC-level price by 20 (the average number 
of UPCs purchased per household shopping trip estimated from the FoodAPS). The average 
UPC-level price of a store is calculated as dividing the total sales by the total units sold for all 
UPCs. It is essentially a quantity weighted average price where the UPCs more frequently 
purchased are put on more weight. All prices are adjusted by 2015 Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
This measure of price is chosen for two reasons. First, constructing a cost of a basket of food 
such as Thrifty Food Plan (TFP, CNPP 2007) for each food store is not feasible because many 
convenience and drug stores do not sell any vegetables or meat. Missing prices of those food 
categories pose a challenging problem to construct the cost of a TFP basket for each store. 
Second, I do not use the variety-adjusted price index that address both product heterogeneity and 
                                                
27 The data include both random-weight food items (usually fresh produce) that have a pseudo UPC and non-
random-weight food items (fixed weight food items) that have a unique UPC.  
28 Some store chains only provide weekly sales datasets at the RMA level. The RMAs of a store chain are aggregate 
geographical areas defined by the retailer and usually include several stores. Thus the individual prices paid for a 
UPC cannot be identified at each store within a RMA. Therefore, I use the average price for the whole RMA to 
impute for each store and assume that if a UPC is sold in the RMA, then all stores in the RMA also sell that UPC at 
the same price.  
29 The covered stores include stores of various types, i.e. mass merchandises, drug stores, convenience stores, dollar 
stores, grocery stores and club stores. 	
30 It is possible that the number of FV items sold is not equal to what’s available in the store. However, I obtain the 
availability measure by summing over all 13 weeks in a given quarter, which lowers the likelihood that an item 
available in the store is never sold once in a quarter. 
31 I do not distinguish canned, frozen and fresh fruits and vegetables here because existing research hasn’t reached 
consensus on which form of fruits and vegetables is more healthful or nutritious. The nutrition value of each type of 
fruits and vegetables may depend on the way of transportation, processing and storage (Rickman, Barrett and Bruhn 
2007) 
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variety bias such as Handbury and Weinstein (2014) and Fan et al. (2017) because the price 
index cannot be easily adapted to calculate the welfare change of policy interventions in dollar 
value like equation (2). However, I do test the robustness of demand estimates when the variety-
adjusted price index and the cost of a basket of commonly available foods across stores are used 
instead. The results are qualitatively similar (presented in Appendix Table E1 and E2).  
Market shares are calculated by dividing food sales of each store by the total food sales of all 
TDLinx stores in a market. TDLinx is the most complete list of geocoded food stores in the U.S. 
that varies annually and is widely used by the industry to analyze the regional retail market. The 
TDLinx contains the names, characteristics, annual sales and geo-coded locations of 594 stores 
in sample counties.32 Furthermore, the store size measured in 1000 square feet is also from 
TDLinx data. The distance from each IRI store to a consumer’s home is evaluated as the distance 
from the store to the population weighted centroid of consumer’s resident census tract. Thus all 
households are assumed to locate in the population-weighted centroid of census tract.33 
The distribution of consumer attributes for each census tract, i.e. income and vehicle access 
comes from 2008-2012 ACS census tract level data and thus does not vary across years. To 
capture the consumer heterogeneity, I obtain a sample of 250 households for each census tract 
based on the empirical distributions of income and vehicle access.34 
                                                
32 I also use 2012 Economic Census of Retail Trade data to define the total sales in a market. Although the sales in 
the Economic Census do not change over time from 2009 to 2012, this is the most comprehensive list of stores to 
date. The results do not change much when using the Economic Census to calculate market shares. 
33 I also assume consumers live in census block group (BG) population weighted centroid (a smaller area than 
census tract) as a robustness check. The results are qualitatively identical. 
34 The ACS provides the share of households in eight income categories in each census tract with cut-off points of 
$12,500, $30,000, $42,500, $62,500, $87,500, $125,000 and $175,000. Multinomial distribution is used to draw 
samples from the eight income categories, i.e. the probability of being in one category is the share of households in 
the tract that belong to the category. The midpoint of each income category is selected afterwards. Two hundred and 
fifty households are randomly selected in a census tract from a Bernoulli distribution where share of households 
with access to car in the census tract is used as the probability of success. Income and vehicle access are thus 
assumed to be independently distributed.  
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Food deserts indicators are from 2010 FARA and are defined as low-income low-access 
census tracts. A low-income census tract is one with either a poverty rate of 20 percent or higher, 
or a median family income at or below 80 percent of the area’s median family income. A low-
access census is one where at least 500 people and/or 33 percent of the population residing more 
than one mile from a supermarket35 in urban areas. This definition of food deserts is commonly 
used in the literature (e.g. Thomsen et al. 2015) and had direct policy implications. For example, 
federal Healthy Food Financing Initiative (HFFI) uses this definition to qualify projects 
expanding access to nutritious food in a food desert. There are 323 urban census tracts in the 
data, 70 of which are food deserts by this definition.36 
Finally, the instrumental variables are constructed using four data sources. The average 
housing value per square feet in each census tract is from the 2008-2012 ACS census-tract level 
data and the census-tract population density is from 2010 Census. The distance from the store to 
the nearest distribution center is looked up and calculated by the author based on information 
from stores’ official websites, annual reports and news. The quarterly regional wholesale prices 
of bananas are from the USDA commodity price data (USDA 2016). 
2.6 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the average census tract characteristics by food deserts and non-food deserts. 
There are fewer households and people living in food deserts. Not surprisingly, households in 
food deserts earn less income, by almost $20,000 than households in non-food deserts. 
Furthermore, households in food deserts are less likely to have access to vehicles. The 
                                                
35 A supermarket is a store that has over 2 million annual sales and has all major food departments including fresh 
produce, fresh meat and poultry, dairy, dry and packaged foods and frozen foods. 
36 The definition of food deserts is hotly debated in the literature. Thus I use vehicle access as an alternative 
definition of food deserts in the robustness test. By 2010 FARA, a census tract is a food desert by vehicle definition 
if at least 100 households are more than 0.5 mile away from the nearest supermarket and have no access to vehicle; 
or at least 500 people or 33 percent of the population live more than 20 miles away from the nearest supermarket, 
regardless of the vehicle access. The results do not change substantially when this alternative measure is used. 
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constraints on healthy food purchases imposed by income and vehicle access are further 
complicated by the lower availability of fruits and vegetables and higher prices in food deserts. 
Food deserts are also farther away from supermarkets than non-food deserts.  
As an example of the sample counties under consideration, a map of census tracts and stores 
in Macon county IL is presented in Figure 1. In Macon county, I find that first, all food deserts 
are urban census tracts. Second, many stores are clustered at the same location, implying the 
economies of agglomeration. Third, the nearest stores of food deserts are mostly drug, dollar and 
convenience stores while non-food deserts are more likely to have a grocery store nearby. The 
other sample counties have similar geographic characteristics as Macon county. 
The summary statistics of store characteristics are reported in table 2. The average food store 
has a market share of 2.5%, sells 427 fruits and vegetables items and costs $46.9 per household 
per grocery shopping trip. The average store size is 27,000 square feet. The most common types 
of food stores are grocery (32%), drug (31%), convenience stores (17%), where the type of stores 
are defined by the IRI. The average distance to the nearest distribution center is modest, 
amounting to 156.4 miles because most of the nearest distribution centers are within the state. 
2.7 Estimation Results 
A simplifying assumption commonly made to solve the integral given in equation (1) is that 
consumer heterogeneity enters the model only through the separable additive random shocks,  ε ijt , 
(i.e. 
 
µijt  does not exist) and that these shocks are distributed i.i.d. with Type I extreme-value 
distribution. This assumption reduces the model to the well-known Logit model, which is 
appealing due to its tractability. However, the Logit model yields restrictive and unrealistic 
substitution patterns, i.e. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The restrictions on the 
cross-price elasticities, which the Logit assumptions imply are a function only of market shares, 
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are crucial to the counterfactual analysis. This assumption implies that if, for example, a CVS 
Pharmacy and a Kroger have similar market shares, then the substitution between a Walgreen’s 
Pharmacy and either of them will be the same, while CVS Pharmacy and Walgreen’s Pharmacy 
are of the same store type and may be more substitutable than Kroger. Therefore, this assumption 
may be restrictive in my case. Nevertheless, due to its computational simplicity, I use the Logit 
model to examine (a) the importance of instrumenting for prices and number of fruits and 
vegetables in the store; (b) the value of including proximity to stores into the demand estimation. 
Columns (1) and (2) in table 3 display the results obtained by regressing difference in log 
market shares (ln(sjt)-ln(s0t)) on prices, number of fruits and vegetables, store size, county, 
quarter and retail chain fixed effects. Column (1) reports the results of ordinary least squares 
regressions. The coefficient on price is positive but close to zero. Column (2) uses instrumental 
variables in two-stage least squares regressions. Notably, when accounting for potential 
endogeneity, the price coefficient becomes negative. Thus the instrument is correcting a positive 
missing variable bias in the OLS estimate, where there are factors unobserved by the 
econometrician for why a household does not go to the cheapest store. For instance, the store 
may be close to the workplace of the consumer. The first stage results of IV Logit model are 
presented in appendix table E3. The Sargan overidentification test statistic of instruments is 
1.495 with p-value of 0.474, which provides suggestive evidence that the IVs satisfy the 
orthogonality conditions. In addition, the first stage F statistic is 12.02 for prices and 10.19 for 
log count of FV UPCs, which suggests strength of the IVs in the estimation. Column (3) 
incorporates the distance from each store to consumer’s home in the demand model. The 
coefficient on distance to stores is statistically significant and the magnitude of price coefficient 
increases by almost five times. It demonstrates the value of including distances to stores and thus 
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spatial differentiation of stores in the demand estimation. 
The estimates of the full model are based on equation (1) and were computed using the 
procedure described in the estimation section. Predicted market shares are computed using 
equation (1) and are based on the empirical distribution of demographics (as sampled according 
to 2012 ACS), independent normal distributions (for v), and Type I extreme value distribution 
(for ε ). The IV’s are store characteristics and cost shifters discussed in the instruments section. 
The results from the preferred specification are presented in table 4. The means of the 
distribution of marginal utilities,  β 's , are presented in the first column. All coefficients are 
statistically significant and of the expected sign. 
Estimates of heterogeneity around these means are presented in the next few columns. Taste 
parameters standard deviations estimates ( σ 's ) are insignificant at conventional significance 
levels, which suggests that unobserved consumer characteristics such as household size and 
education, do not affect consumers’ valuation of fruits and vegetables availability, proximity and 
prices of stores.37 As expected, households with higher income are less price sensitive and prefer 
more fruits and vegetables offered in a store.38 Furthermore, households with access to vehicles 
value distance to stores in a less negative way but richer households who are more time-
constraint prefer closer stores for grocery shopping. 
To compare the relative importance of store attributes in consumers’ store choices, the 
elasticities of store attributes with respect to market shares are presented in table 5. The 
elasticities are evaluated at the average store attributes based on demand estimates in table 4. The 
results demonstrate that price is the most important factor in determining consumers’ choice of 
                                                
37 One may be concerned that insignificant  σ 's  suggest weak IVs. However, Houde and Gandhi (2016) indicate that 
insignificant  σ 's  are necessary not sufficient conditions for weak IVs. 
38 I do not find that access to vehicle significantly affects preferences for FV offerings in the store directly. The 
results are presented in appendix table E4.  
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stores and is much more important than the availability of FV and store proximity. I find that 
price has a much larger elasticity than FV availability and store proximity in magnitudes. 
Furthermore, when households have access to vehicle, FV availability is valued more than store 
proximity. This comparison suggests that even a far-away store expands its selection of FV, as 
long as the household has access to vehicle, it will also greatly benefit the household, which is 
demonstrated in the counterfactual analysis.   
Additionally, I observe substantial heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences towards prices 
and store attributes. Specifically, higher income households have lower price sensitivity, prefer 
better access to FV and closer stores. An average household with annual household income of  
$12,500 is almost three times more price sensitive than one that earns $200,000 per year. 
Similarly, the elasticity of availability of FV and distance to store increases by almost four times 
(column 2-4) when the households’ annual income rises from $12,500 to $200,000. In addition 
to income, access to vehicles plays a big role in consumers’ valuation of store proximity. The 
elasticities of market shares with respect to distances to store for households without access to 
vehicles are 23%-46% higher than households with access. Lastly, I find that food deserts 
households are 20% more price sensitive than non-food deserts households. In summary, price is 
the most important factor for consumers when deciding where to shop, particularly for 
consumers living in food deserts. 
Table 6 presents the WTP for 10% increase in the number of FV (an average increase of 43 
UPCs) and one mile increase in the distance to stores to quantify the monetary value of different 
store attributes. The WTP per shopping trip is calculated based on equation (3) where both 
change in the likelihood of patronizing a store (extensive margin effects) and the value of a store 
attribute conditional on patronizing the store (intensive margin effects) are accounted for. Then 
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the WTP per trip is multiplied by the annual average number of grocery shopping trips (104) 
based on the FoodAPS, where households pay two grocery shopping trips per week on average. 
The WTP demonstrates the monetary values of different store attributes and thus forecasts the 
impact of policy interventions aimed at changing these store attributes.  
There are three central findings from table 6. First, the WTP for FV access and store 
proximity per year is small in magnitude, regardless of household income and vehicle access. 
Specifically, in table 6, both the WTP for FV availability and distance to store are less than $10 
per year. It is due to the fact that an average store has a small market share (2.5%) and it suggests 
that due to the competition effects, even if a store’s offerings of FV and distance to consumers’ 
home are improved, given that consumers have many other store choices that have already 
provided a good selection of FV items and are close, changing the availability of FV and store 
proximity will not divert a lot of market shares from the competitors into the store. The 
importance of competition effects and hence extensive margin effects has crucial welfare 
implications, which will be discussed in the counterfactual analysis.  
Second, there is substantive consumer heterogeneity in the WTP for availability of FV and 
store proximity. A household with $200,000 annual income but no access to vehicles is willing 
to pay $6.4 per year to have a store one mile closer to home, more than doubling the WTP of a 
similar household with the lowest income level ($2.9). Besides, having access to vehicles does 
not completely remove the utility from having closer stores. Time cost is still very important, in 
spite of access to vehicles, especially for high-income households. For instance, both with access 
to vehicles, a household with $200,000 annual income is willing to pay over two times higher 
than a $12,500 income counterpart for a store to come one mile closer. Importantly, a household 
with $200,000 annual income is willing to pay over two times more for a ten percent increase in 
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the number of FV than the household with annual income of $12,500. High-income households’ 
stronger preference for good access to FV suggests that they may benefit more than low-income 
households from policies that expand access to FV.  
Third, non-food deserts (NFD) households, who are richer than food deserts (FD) 
households on average, are willing to pay more money for both closer stores and more FV in a 
store than NFD households. In short, FD households have lower preferences towards good 
access to FV than NFD households, which supports the argument that large grocery stores do not 
locate in food deserts because of lower demand.  
Table 7 shows the WTP for a similar increase in the number of FV and distance to stores but 
only accounts for intensive margin effects. I find that the intensive margin effects are $2.25-4.89 
per week for households without vehicle access and $1.66-3.81 for those with vehicle access as 
distance to stores increase by one mile. My estimates are of similar magnitude as Taylor and 
Villas-Boas (2016) who find that households are willing to pay $2-5 and $1-6 per week to have a 
Superstore and a Supermarket 1 mile closer to their home, respectively. This result again 
highlights the importance of incorporating extensive margin effects when quantifying the 
benefits of policy interventions. 
2.8 Counterfactual Analysis 
In this section, I first estimate the welfare effect of a specific policy intervention that increases 
the offerings of FV in the nearest non-grocery store of each food desert. The county-level 
welfare benefits are calculated and compared with estimates of the cost of the intervention to 
assess the effectiveness of the policy. Next, to compare with the benefits of increasing the variety 
of FV offered, I estimate the welfare effects of a policy intervention that subsidizes the prices of 
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fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store in a food desert.39 Last, I explore the 
differences in preferences between FD and NFD households by moving a FD household to a 
NFD, and vice versa, changing store characteristics and prices the households face, but 
preserving their preferences. By comparing the changes in consumer welfare in these two 
scenarios, one can infer whether preferences explain, at least in part, why supermarkets do not 
locate in food deserts. 
Table 8 presents the changes in consumer welfare associated with the nearest non-grocery 
store in each food deserts census tract increasing its offerings of FV. The total welfare changes 
per county over 10 and 20 years are shown. The counterfactual changes are simulated by setting 
the number of FV UPCs in the nearest non-grocery store to 50, 100, 250, 350 and 1,200 if these 
numbers are larger than the actual amount in the intervene store. The smallest three amounts of 
FV UPCs are approximately the median, 95th percentile and maximum number of FV UPCs in 
non-grocery stores, and the larger two are about the minimum and median number of FV UPCs 
in grocery stores. The counterfactual numbers of FV are similar to those sold by Family Dollar 
(50), Kmart (100), CVS Pharmacy (250), Fred Meyer (350) and Safeway (1,200). The annual 
welfare change is calculated based on equation (2).  
I calculate the total compensating variation (CV) over 10 and 20 years to fully capture the 
potential total consumer welfare impact of the policies.40 According to the Department of 
Treasury New Markets Tax Credits Programs for financing supermarkets in food deserts, 
industry investors desire an annual yield in the neighborhood of 4.2% (U.S. Treasury 2011). 
                                                
39 Although the BLP model tends to overestimate welfare gains with simulations of increasing product space 
(Ackerberg and Rysman 2005), the counterfactual analysis of this paper does not enlarge the choice set but rather 
change store attributes (i.e. number of FV and prices). Thus the welfare implications are not inherently 
overestimated. 
40 According to industry standards, the average period before a food store has a major renovation is 7-10 years. I also 
present results with 20 years as an upper bound of the benefits of the policy interventions.  
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Thus I use 4.2% to discount annual compensating variation. The cost of the different policy 
interventions is calculated by multiplying the average cost of expanding the selection of FV in 
existing stores funded by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) HFFI, i.e. 
$1,127,900 (HHS 2015) with the number of intervene stores. One limitation of this figure is the 
fact that the HHS-HHFI funded stores are largely small independent stores increasing number of 
FV items by less than 100, thus the actual costs for policy interventions aimed at increasing the 
number of FV UPCs to levels of large grocery stores, i.e. UPC=350 and 1,200 are probably 
much larger than the costs provided in table 8. The nearest non-grocery stores of FD census 
tracts are mostly established drug and convenience retail chains, i.e. Family Dollar and Circle K, 
which may need to invest much more than $1,127,900 to have as many FV items as in Fred 
Meyer (UPC=350) and Safeway (UPC=1200). Thus the estimated net benefits of these two 
policy interventions are upper bounds. 
There are four central findings from this counterfactual analysis. First, consumers benefit 
from this policy intervention, and the total welfare gain ranges from $1,475,443 to $25,428,399 
over 20 years (table 8). Second, after isolating the effect of population (table 9), I find that an 
average FD household gained $2.8 (0.4%) to $96.0 (13.1%) whereas an average NFD household 
gained $4.2 (0.6%) to $ 112.3 (15.3%) per year. So even if just the store nearest to the FD was 
targeted by a policy to provide more FV, NFD households would also benefit because NFD 
households value better access to FV more than FD households as shown in table 6, a store being 
far away doesn’t bother them much compared to being able to shop more FV in the store. 
Third, such a policy expanding access to FV may not generate enough benefits to cover the 
cost of the policy intervention especially when the number of FV is increased to a limited 
amount (i.e. 50 and 100). Furthermore, the impact on the healthfulness of food purchases is 
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limited. To estimate the maximum effect on FV purchases of this type of intervention, I assume 
the increased market shares of intervene stores all go to FV while the decreased market shares of 
non-intervene stores are all from lower purchases of non-FV. Appendix table E5 shows that after 
such a policy intervention, the average sales shares of FV of the whole county only increased 
0.08-0.13 percentage points. This result is consistent for most reasonable price/distance 
parameter ranges as suggested by the small standard errors. Thus the policy interventions aimed 
at increasing the number of FV in food desert stores have limited effects on both consumer 
welfare and healthfulness of food purchases. 
Fourth, the small benefit from increasing a limited amount of FV in existing stores is caused 
by both small changes on the extensive and intensive margin. From the extensive margin, 
existing grocery stores in the market already provide cheap and a wide selection of FV to FD 
consumers; according to FoodAPS data, over 90% of FD households have access to vehicles and 
choose a supermarket for their primary grocery shopping regardless of their distance from the 
store. Having vehicle access moderates the effects of local neighborhood supply conditions on 
constraining the choice set. This implication is further supported by the small changes in market 
shares between intervene and non-intervene stores in each policy scenario in table 10. From the 
intensive margin, consumers do not value proximity to FV much compared to price. Therefore, 
improved availability of FV would not attract more low-income consumers to visit the stores if 
the prices are not lowered and preferences are unchanged. 
I demonstrate how consumer heterogeneity affects the CVs estimated in each policy 
scenario. In table 11, the log of the CV for each household-quarter is regressed against log 
income, log distance, log distance interacted with vehicle access, as well as county and quarter 
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fixed effects.41 I find that within the same county and quarter, richer households benefit more 
from expanding access to FV in food deserts, and the benefit is larger when more FV UPCs were 
included in stores near food deserts. Households who live farther away from the intervene store 
and do not have vehicle access benefit less from the policy. But for households with access to 
vehicle, distance to the intervene stores does not matter at all in determining how much they 
benefit from the policy. This explains the reason why NFD households on average benefit more 
from expanding FV in FD, i.e. NFD households are richer and have better access to vehicles. 
If the policies that only increase the number of FV are not effective in changing behavior or 
improving welfare, what policies might help mitigate the problem of food deserts? Because price 
is more important in changing households’ store choice, reducing FV prices in food deserts may 
be more useful. Table 12 presents the welfare impact when the FV prices in the nearest non-
grocery store of food deserts were lowered by 1%, 5%, 10%, 20% and 30%. The cost of each 
policy intervention is calculated by multiplying the price difference with FV quantities sold to 
assume that government subsidize every FV item sold in the nearest non-grocery store of food 
deserts.42 On all counterfactual levels, the benefits were greater than cost of the interventions. 
Notably, decreasing FV prices by 5% and 10% generates similar benefits as increasing the 
number of FV items to the levels of Fred Meyer (350) and Safeway (1200). Note that I assume 
all subsidies are passed through to consumers and that non-intervene stores do not respond by 
adjusting their prices. Competition effects and price reductions by other stores in response would 
be expected to increase the welfare effect of this policy. In contrast to the FV selection 
interventions analyzed above, the price reduction policy is more beneficial for FD households, 
                                                
41 I assume each census tract has a representative household that lives in the population-weighted centroid, earns 
average income and has average access to vehicle of the census tract. 
42 I first calculate the increased FV quantities sold due to price reduction based on the price elasticity of FV demand 
estimated in the literature (Andreyeva, Long and Brownell 2010). Then the increased FV quantities sold is added to 
the baseline FV quantities to obtain the new total FV quantities sold after price reduction. 
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which is shown in table 13. The results are precisely estimated and the welfare implications are 
consistent for 95% confidence intervals of price/distance parameter estimates. This result 
suggests that price reduction policies may be more cost-effective and have better distributional 
effects, i.e. benefit the FD households the policy is intended to help. 
How do the price reductions policies affect fruits and vegetables purchases? To answer this 
question, I assume all increased market shares of intervened stores go to FV and decreased 
market shares of non-intervened stores go to NFV. Thus the estimate gives an upper bound of the 
true effect of FV price reductions on FV purchases. After calculating the total increased FV sales 
per county per year, I divide it by 365 days times the total population of the county to back out 
the total increased FV sales per person per day. Lastly, I divide the total increased FV sales per 
person per day by the average price of half of a banana ($0.015) which amounts to one serving of 
fruits and vegetables. Table 14 presents the results that a 30% reduction in FV prices of the 
nearest non-grocery store of food deserts would lead to 0.54 more servings of FV purchased per 
person per day, or 6% of the daily recommended FV consumption provided in the Dietary 
Guidelines for Americans 2015-2020 (HHS and USDA 2015). The results suggest that price 
reduction programs are not only cost-effective but may also generate increased purchases of 
fruits and vegetables for individuals. 
I also explore the regional heterogeneity in the counterfactual analysis to see if the results 
vary by different regions of the country. Appendix table E6 presents the demand estimates by 
region. The results suggest that Northeasterners and Westerners prefer more FV and closer stores, 
while Midwesterners and Southerners are more price sensitive. This result has direct welfare 
implications. Because FV selection and store proximity are more important for Northeasterners 
and Westerners, policies aimed at increasing the number of FV in food deserts stores are more 
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effective in Northeast and West than other regions as shown in appendix table E7. In contrast, 
because households from Midwest and South are more price sensitive, policies targeted at 
reducing FV prices are more effective as shown in appendix table E8. Nevertheless, the welfare 
impact of price reduction policy is larger for all regions compared to that of FV increase 
intervention. In the Northeast and West, 10% FV price reduction is similar to increasing FV 
UPCs to 1,200 while in the Midwest and South, the FV price reduction that generates similar 
welfare impact is 5%. Lastly, similar to the main results, FV price reduction policy benefits FD 
households more and thus has better distributional effects than FV increase interventions. This 
analysis highlights the importance of regional heterogeneity and suggests that HFFI should be 
designed to fit the local demand and supply conditions in each low-income, low-access area in 
question. 
The third set of counterfactual analyses explores the differences in preferences between FD 
and NFD households. Specifically, I ask whether preferences or local food access plays a larger 
role in determining store choices. To tackle this, I simulate the welfare change of a household 
from a FD census tract if faced with store attributes and prices from a NFD census tract. I start 
by examining the behavior of the average FD household. The simulation can be viewed as 
moving a FD household to a NFD census tract, changing only its shopping environment, namely 
the store attributes and prices, and asking how their welfare would change. In particular, 
household’s income and access to vehicle are envisioned as staying constant. Then consumers’ 
welfare in these counterfactuals are then compared to actual welfare of the average consumer in 
the FD. 
In defining preferences I always use the estimated random coefficients  α i ,βi ,γ i in table 4 
from the home FD census tract. In the counterfactual, preferences are those of average household 
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in a FD, but store attributes are of a NFD household. In this analysis, the store attribute is the 
distance to store dij. The welfare change between the counterfactual (consumer i in NFD s) and 
the average consumer i in the FD i is defined as 
 
ΔWit = −
1
α i
log 1+ exp α i p jt + x jtβi + dsjγ i + ξ jt( )
j∈Jt
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
                            + 1
α i
log 1+ exp α i p jt + x jtβi + dijγ i + ξ jt( )
j∈Jt
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
 
which captures the effect of store access on consumer welfare. In other words, the consumer 
welfare is a lump sum monetary measure of households’ local food retail environment. Thus, the 
differential changes in consumer welfare quantify how important the local food retail access is to 
FD and NFD households differently. 
Table 15 presents the results that consumers are better off with closer access to FV. But the 
benefit was $72.17 for an average household in FD, which is only a 9.9% increase in the 
household’s annual welfare from grocery shopping. In table 16, I reverse the counterfactual 
analysis and move the NFD household to a FD instead. As a result, the NFD household 
experienced a big drop in their welfare by 31.5% or $230.34. Both changes in welfare are 
precisely estimated with small standard errors. The big difference in magnitude indicates that FD 
households may not value proximity to FV as much as a NFD household and changing the store 
distances does not alter FD households’ shopping behavior a lot. This result suggests that local 
food retailers in food deserts may lack incentives to improve the availability of FV. Additionally, 
the lower preferences may make supermarkets reluctant to enter food deserts. In conclusion, 
lower preferences of closer access to FV in food deserts may be one factor in explaining why 
food deserts exist. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
This article uses a random coefficients discrete choice model to estimate a store-level demand 
system for the food retail industry. Parameter identification is based on an independent 
assumption of demand shocks with cost shifters. The estimated parameters are used to compute 
the welfare impact of subsidizing either the number or prices of fruits and vegetables in the 
nearest non-grocery stores of food deserts. Furthermore, the welfare change of a food desert 
(non-food desert) household moving to a non-food desert (food desert) census tract is evaluated 
to explore why food deserts exist. 
I find that first, price is the most important factor when consumers decide where to shop and 
is much more important than availability of fruits and vegetables and store proximity. Second, 
the consumer’s welfare rise by little when the number of fruits and vegetables are increased by a 
small amount in each nearest store of food deserts. It is due to the fact that consumers do not 
value availability of fruits and vegetables as much as prices, and most consumers have access to 
vehicles and are thus less constrained by store distances to shop in the nearest supermarkets. 
Third, fruits and vegetables price subsidies are more effective policies to improve consumer 
welfare and have better distributional effects in benefiting food deserts households more. Lastly, 
food deserts households have lower demand for better access to fruits and vegetables and may 
explain, at least in part, why food deserts exist. 
The results have three important policy implications. First, expanding availability of fruits 
and vegetables without changing prices or consumers preferences has limited effect on 
increasing consumers’ welfare. Second, since price is the most important factor in poor 
households’ store choices, policies impacting prices could affect store choices and benefit food 
deserts households more than non-food deserts counterparts. Third, food desert residents have 
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very different demand for store attributes than non-food desert residents. These differences may 
be driven largely by income and preferences. Therefore, policies improving demand and income 
of households in food deserts could be more effective in enhancing welfare. 
My study points to at least two areas for future research. First, although the measure of 
consumer welfare is theoretically founded and useful for benefit-cost analysis of policy 
intervention, direct health benefits may not be incorporated into consumer welfare. Thus future 
research on the impact of food deserts policies on nutrition and health would allow researchers to 
observe how policies influence welfare that includes health. Second, in this article I focus on the 
demand side and consumer welfare. While providing a useful benchmark for evaluating policies 
targeted at food deserts, the demand model can be combined with different models of supply 
conduct. In doing so one can evaluate how equilibrium prices change in response to different 
policy interventions and incorporate the producer surplus into the welfare analysis. 
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2.10 Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Average Census Tract Characteristics 
 
 Food Deserts Non-Food Deserts 
Number of census tracts 70 253 
Number of households 1686 
(709) 
1690 
(742) 
Population  4471 
(1792) 
4470 
(1996) 
Tract Family Median Income ($) 43,819 
(13,117) 
63,035 
(21,200) 
Access to vehicles 0.90 
(0.08) 
0.94 
(0.07) 
Number of fruits and vegetables 
UPCs in the nearest store 
900 
(1528) 
3460 
(1275) 
Price of the nearest store (2015 $) 51.32 
(7.77) 
44.83 
(11.78) 
Distance to the nearest 
supermarket (miles) 
3.87 
(6.13) 
3.25 
(3.62) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of Store Characteristics 
 
 Mean 
(Std) 
Market shares (%) 2.5 
(4.5) 
Number of fruits and vegetables UPCs 427.4 
(609.4) 
Prices (2015 $) 46.9 
(12.8) 
Store size (1000 square feet) 27.0 
(30.0) 
Grocery stores 0.32 
(0.47) 
Club stores 0.01 
(0.11) 
Mass merchandiser 0.06 
(0.24) 
Drug stores 0.31 
(0.46) 
Convenience stores 0.17 
(0.37) 
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Table 2.2 (cont.) 
Dollar Stores 0.13 
(0.34) 
Distance to the nearest distribution center (miles) 156.4 
(271.4) 
Number of observations 2,888 
 
 
Table 2.3 Demand Estimates 
 
Variables OLS Logit 
 
(1) 
IV Logit 
 
(2) 
Random 
Coefficients 
(3) 
Price 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.086*** 
(0.031) 
-0.419*** 
(0.175) 
Log count of fruits and vegetables UPCs 0.033*** 
(0.006) 
-0.0007 
(0.206) 
0.628*** 
(0.465) 
Store size 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
Log distance to store   -1.129*** 
(0.035) 
No. of Observations 2,668 2,668 2,668 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. The instrumental variables are the distance from the store to the nearest distribution 
center, distance to the nearest distribution center interacted with quarterly regional banana prices, 
housing value per square feet and population density of the store census tract. 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Results from Full Model  
 
Variables Means 
( β 's ) 
Standard 
Deviations 
Interaction with Demographic 
Variables 
  ( σ 's ) Vehicle Access Log Income 
Price -0.433*** 
(0.022) 
0.589 
(0.101) 
   0.028*** 
(0.007) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
0.585*** 
 (0.145) 
0.263 
(0.560) 
 0.089** 
(0.016) 
Store size  0.008*** 
(0.003) 
   
Log distance to store -0.498*** 
(0.053) 
0.713 
(0.578) 
0.321*** 
(0.076) 
-0.078*** 
(0.002) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. 
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Table 2.5 Elasticities of Market Shares 
 
Income Category Price FV  
Distance  
(With Vehicle) 
Distance 
(Without 
Vehicle) 
Distance 
(Average 
Vehicle Access)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
$12,500 
-12.32 
(1.76) 
0.112 
(0.015) 
-0.078 
(0.021) 
-0.081 
(0.023) 
-0.079 
(0.026) 
$30,000 
-11.92 
(1.88) 
0.182 
(0.011) 
-0.102 
(0.018) 
-0.135 
(0.019) 
-0.114 
(0.018) 
$42,500 
-10.21 
(1.38) 
0.201 
(0.010) 
-0.123 
(0.012) 
-0.159 
(0.016) 
-0.131 
(0.017) 
$62,500 
-9.45 
(1.68) 
0.276 
(0.010) 
-0.154 
(0.012) 
-0.211 
(0.017) 
-0.158 
(0.014) 
$87,500 
-8.93 
(1.33) 
0.311 
(0.011) 
-0.179 
(0.009) 
-0.234 
(0.013) 
-0.184 
(0.013) 
$125,000 
-7.72 
(1.99) 
0.378 
(0.010) 
-0.213 
(0.015) 
-0.265 
(0.015) 
-0.221 
(0.014) 
$175,000 
-6.19 
(1.22) 
0.421 
(0.013) 
-0.236 
(0.018) 
-0.299 
(0.018) 
-0.241 
(0.020) 
$200,000 
-4.92 
(1.01) 
0.480 
(0.018) 
-0.278 
(0.019) 
-0.346 
(0.020) 
-0.284 
(0.021) 
Food Access Category    
  
 
Food Deserts 
-9.32 
(1.44) 
0.212 
(0.010) 
-0.146 
(0.014) 
-0.213 
(0.016) 
-0.154 
(0.018) 
Non-Food Deserts 
-8.11 
(1.48) 
0.352 
(0.010) 
-0.183 
(0.018) 
-0.273 
(0.019) 
-0.194 
(0.020) 
Notes: All elasticities correspond to 1% increase in price, number of FV UPCs and distance in 
miles. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 2.6 Annual Household Willingness to Pay for Store Attributes (Intensive and 
Extensive Margins) 
 
Income Category FV  
Distance  
(With 
Vehicle) 
Distance  
(Without 
Vehicle) 
Distance 
(Average 
Vehicle Access) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
$12,500 
$2.2 
(0.31) 
-$2.2 
(0.11) 
-$2.9 
(0.20) 
-$2.2 
(0.22) 
$30,000 
$2.7 
(0.32) 
-$2.7 
(0.12) 
-$3.6 
(0.14) 
-$2.8 
(0.19) 
$42,500 
$3.0 
(0.30) 
-$3.0 
(0.12) 
-$4.0 
(0.12) 
-$3.1 
(0.18) 
$62,500 
$3.3 
(0.29) 
-$3.4 
(0.09) 
-$4.4 
(0.13) 
-$3.4 
(0.19) 
$87,500 
$3.6 
(0.34) 
-$3.7 
(0.04) 
-$4.8 
(0.14) 
-$3.8 
(0.17) 
$125,000 
$4.1 
(0.35) 
-$4.2 
(0.11) 
-$5.4 
(0.15) 
-$4.3 
(0.16) 
$175,000 
$4.5 
(0.30) 
-$4.7 
(0.13) 
-$6.1 
(0.16) 
-$4.8 
(0.18) 
$200,000 
$4.8 
(0.33) 
-$5.0 
(0.14) 
-$6.4 
(0.18) 
-$5.0 
(0.21) 
Food Access Category     
Food Deserts 
$3.0 
(0.32) 
-$3.0 
(0.15) 
-$4.0 
(0.17) 
-$3.1 
(0.16) 
Non-Food Deserts 
$3.3 
(0.35) 
-$3.4 
(0.17) 
-$4.4 
(0.16) 
-$3.4 
(0.18) 
Notes: Column (1) corresponds to the WTP for 10% increase in the number of fruits and 
vegetables in a store on average. Column (2)-(4) denote the WTP for one mile increase in the 
distance to the store. Average vehicle access uses the average census tract share of vehicle access 
in each income category. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 2.7 Annual Household Willingness to Pay for Store Attributes (Intensive Margin) 
 
Income Category FV  
Distance  
(With 
Vehicle) 
Distance  
(Without 
Vehicle) 
Distance 
(Average 
Vehicle Access) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
$12,500 
$87.7 
(15.34) 
-$86.5 
(15.44) 
-$116.9 
(17.87) 
-$88.6 
(15.89) 
$30,000 
$108.3 
(12.23) 
-$108.7 
(17.88) 
-$144.3 
(10.12) 
-$111.2 
(18.39) 
$42,500 
$118.5 
(13.11) 
-$119.9 
(18.98) 
-$158.0 
(12.28) 
-$122.5 
(11.23) 
$62,500 
$131.7 
(14.02) 
-$134.2 
(13.33) 
-$175.7 
(13.45) 
-$137.1 
(14.89) 
$87,500 
$145.3 
(13.23) 
-$148.9 
(14.39) 
-$193.8 
(15.45) 
-$152.1 
(17.63) 
$125,000 
$162.3 
(12.44) 
-$167.4 
(15.34) 
-$216.6 
(17.87) 
-$170.9 
(20.83) 
$175,000 
$181.7 
(15.23) 
-$188.5 
(16.38) 
-$242.5 
(18.34) 
-$192.3 
(22.98) 
$200,000 
$190.5 
(21.67) 
-$198.0 
(19.88) 
-$254.3 
(21.22) 
-$202.0 
(23.77) 
Food Access Category     
Food Deserts 
$119.5 
(12.21) 
-$120.9 
(14.23) 
-$159.3 
(16.78) 
-$124.7 
(15.68) 
Non-Food Deserts 
$132.0 
(13.33) 
-$134.5 
(16.89) 
-$176.1 
(18.89) 
-$137.0 
(10.19) 
Notes: Column (1) corresponds to the WTP for 10% increase in the number of fruits and 
vegetables in a store on average. Column (2)-(4) denote the WTP for one mile increase in the 
distance to the store. Average vehicle access uses the average census tract share of vehicle access 
in each income category. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table 2.8 Average Change in Consumer Welfare Per County 
 
No. of FV 
UPCs 
Compensating 
Variation  
(10 years) 
Compensating 
Variation 
(20 years) 
Cost 
50 $886,968 (132,768) 
$1,475,443 
(273,241) $3,383,700 
100 $2,117,185 (373,789) 
$2,928,592 
(223,889) $3,383,700 
250 $4,939,857 (448,893) 
$8,215,586 
(640,782) $3,383,700 
350 $6,270,647 (568,938) 
$10,446,241 
(787,982) $4,511,600 
1200 $18,256,178 (1,478,234) 
$25,428,399 
(2,678,213) $4,511,600 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
increase the number of fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store of each food deserts 
census tract to different levels as indicated by the No. of FV UPCs. Asymptotically robust s.e. 
are reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2.9 Average Change in Consumer Welfare Per Household Per Year 
 
No. of FV UPCs Total Food Deserts 
Non-Food 
Deserts Total 
Food 
Deserts 
Non-Food 
Deserts 
50 $3.6 (1.03) 
$2.8 
(1.05) 
$4.2 
(1.08) 
0.5% 
(0.11%) 
0.4% 
(0.14%) 
0.6% 
(0.13%) 
100 $8.6 (3.11) 
$7.5 
(3.41) 
$13.3 
(3.56) 
1.2% 
(0.41%) 
1.0% 
(0.43) 
1.8% 
(0.44%) 
250 $32.1 (5.12) 
$29.5 
(5.56) 
$38.1 
(5.98) 
4.4% 
(1.34%) 
4.0% 
(1.39%) 
5.2% 
(1.35%) 
350 $45.5 (6.34) 
$41.6 
(6.88) 
$49.6 
(6.98) 
6.2% 
(1.52%) 
5.7% 
(1.58%) 
6.8% 
(1.60%) 
1200 $101.5 (10.98) 
$96.0 
(10.12) 
$112.3 
(10.01) 
13.9% 
(2.03%) 
13.1% 
(2.11%) 
15.3% 
(2.15%) 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
increase the number of fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store of each food deserts 
census tract to different levels as indicated by the No. of FV UPCs. Asymptotically robust s.e. 
are reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 2.10 Average Changes in Store Market Shares 
 
No. of FV 
UPCs Intervene Stores Non-Intervene Stores 
50 1.3 pp (0.21) 
-0.64 pp 
(0.14) 
100 1.7 pp (0.23) 
-0.79 pp 
(0.11) 
250 1.9 pp (0.24) 
-0.88 pp 
(0.15) 
350 1.9 pp (0.21) 
-0.91 pp 
(0.16) 
1200 2.2 pp (0.26) 
-1.10 pp 
(0.18) 
Notes: pp stands for percentage points. The counterfactual policy is to increase the number of 
fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store of each food deserts census tract to 
different levels as indicated by the No. of FV UPCs. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in 
the parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 2.11 Effects of Income and Distance on Log Compensating Variation (CV) 
 
Variable UPC=50 UPC=100 UPC=250 UPC=350 UPC=1200 
Log income 0.141** (0.073) 
0.148** 
(0.066) 
0.181** 
(0.087) 
0.209*** 
(0.067) 
0.284*** 
(0.062) 
Log distance -1.761*** (0.312) 
-1.784*** 
(0.301) 
-1.680*** 
(0.473) 
-1.785*** 
(0.262) 
-1.761*** 
(0.638) 
Log distance X 
vehicle access 
1.859*** 
(0.438) 
1.684*** 
(0.451) 
1.789*** 
(0.599) 
1.779*** 
(0.671) 
1.782*** 
(0.421) 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the county level. The unit of observation is a household-quarter. Distance 
is measured from the household census tract centroid to nearest intervene store within the same 
county. 
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Table 2.12 Average Change in Consumer Welfare Per County 
 
Price 
Reduction 
Compensating 
Variation  
(10 years) 
 
Cost  
(10 years) 
Compensating 
Variation 
(20 years) 
 
Cost  
(20 years) 
1% $1,223,406 (104,234) 
$733,953 
 
$2,034,168 
(290,123) 
$1,467,906 
 
5% $8,286,025 (573,879) 
$3,762,195 
 
$13,777,247 
(798,236) 
$7,524,390 
 
10% $13,164,336 (878,213) 
$5,755,471 
 
$21,888,458 
(1,189,120) 
$11,510,942 
 
20% $25,192,795 (1,872,398) 
$10,435,266 
 
$41,888,285 
(4,318,298) 
$20,870,532 
 
30% $72,783,200 (4,879,217) 
$26,039,387 
 
$101,267,635 
(5,879,412) 
$52,078,774 
 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
decrease prices in the nearest non-grocery store of each food desert census tract by different 
percentages as indicated in the price reduction column. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in 
the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2.13 Average Change in Consumer Welfare Per Household Per Year 
 
Price Reduction Total Food Deserts 
Non-Food 
Deserts Total 
Food 
Deserts 
Non-Food 
Deserts 
1% $3.49 (1.11) 
$4.03 
(1.21) 
$3.06 
(1.67) 
0.48% 
(0.11%) 
0.55% 
(0.23%) 
0.42% 
(0.23%) 
5% $25.60 (2.30) 
$26.99 
(2.89) 
$20.59 
(2.28) 
3.50% 
(0.23%) 
3.69% 
(0.32%) 
2.81% 
(0.12%) 
10% $50.68 (6.78) 
$52.48 
(6.87) 
$41.37 
(5.78) 
6.92% 
(1.45%) 
7.17% 
(1.34%) 
5.65% 
(1.32%) 
20% $78.19 (8.89) 
$82.37 
(8.98) 
$63.31 
(7.88) 
10.68% 
(1.22%) 
11.25% 
(1.87%) 
8.65% 
(1.44%) 
30% $137.37 (10.21) 
$143.00 
(11.38) 
$115.15 
(9.87) 
18.77% 
(2.23%) 
19.53% 
(2.23%) 
15.73% 
(2.21%) 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
decrease prices in the nearest non-grocery store of each food desert census tract by different 
percentages as indicated in the price reduction column. Asymptotically robust s.e. are reported in 
the parentheses. 
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Table 2.14 Average Changes in Fruit and Vegetables Servings Sold Per Person Per Day 
 
Price Reduction Change in Servings Sold 
1% 0.08 (0.02) 
5% 0.11 (0.04) 
10% 0.21 (0.05) 
20% 0.32 (0.06) 
30% 0.54 (0.08) 
Notes: The counterfactual policy is to decrease prices in the nearest non-grocery store of each 
food desert census tract by different percentages as indicated in the price reduction column. 
Standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
 
Table 2.15 Annual Consumer Welfare Impact of a Food Deserts Household Moving to a 
Non-Food Desert 
 
Statistic Value Percentage Change 
Mean $72.17 
(10.89) 
9.9% 
(1.43%) 
Median $45.91 
(13.45) 
6.3% 
(1.23%) 
Min -$31.62 
(12.32) 
-4.3% 
(2.12%) 
Max $752.81 
(102.78) 
102.9% 
(18.12%) 
% Change>0 94.78  
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. Asymptotically robust s.e. are 
reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 2.16 Annual Consumer Welfare Impact of a Non-Food Deserts Household Moving to 
a Food Desert 
 
Statistic Value Percentage Change 
Mean -$230.34 
(53.28) 
-31.5% 
(3.78%) 
Median -$169.21 
(34.87) 
-23.1% 
(3.44%) 
Min -$6,565.32 
(231.39) 
-896.6% 
(58.3%) 
   
Table 2.16 (cont.) 
Max $0 
(10.21) 
0.0% 
(5.88%) 
% Change>0 100  
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. Asymptotically robust s.e. are 
reported in the parentheses. 
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2.11 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1 Stores in Macon County  
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CHAPTER 3: The Welfare Impact of Subsidizing Grocery Stores into Food Deserts  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
I study the impact of government subsidies for grocery stores to enter the most severe food 
deserts (low-income communities with limited access to grocery stores) on consumer and 
producer welfare in the U.S. I use detailed, geocoded, store sales and consumer store choice data 
to (1) estimate a discrete choice demand system for food stores with consumer heterogeneity, (2) 
estimate a supply side profit maximization function based on Nash-Bertrand mode of price 
competition and (3) simulate the welfare impact of a low-cost grocery store to enter the most 
severe food deserts. I find that although consumers gain significantly from this policy, the new 
low-cost grocery stores would find it unprofitable to operate in the most severe food deserts, thus 
casting doubt on the effectiveness of this policy. 
 
Keywords: inequality, food deserts, social welfare, demand estimation, store choice 
 
JEL Codes: D12, I31, L81, Q18, R20 
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3.1 Introduction 
Socioeconomic inequality is present in many aspects of society, including education opportunity, 
environmental amenities, neighborhood safety and food access (Cole and Foster 2001; Aizer and 
Currie 2014; Chetty et al. 2014; Case and Deaton 2015). One important component of the recent 
movement on equating socioeconomic gap is promoting equitable access to healthy and 
affordable food to all people with different socioeconomic status. In this paper, I analyze the 
expected welfare impact of one popular policy targeted at addressing food access, subsidizing 
low-cost grocery stores into food deserts and analyze whether such a policy is effective. 
Low-income households have poorer diets and higher rates of obesity than high-income 
households in many developed countries around the world (Drewnowski and Specter 2004; 
Swinburn et al. 2011). However, it is unclear why these disparities exist. Poor diets can be driven 
by three factors: limited access to healthy foods, higher prices of healthy foods, or preferences 
for unhealthy foods. Under the assumption that differential access plays an important role in 
explaining nutritional disparities, many countries have implemented policies to improve food 
access in food deserts. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 2001 Food Poverty Eradication 
Bill required local and national governments to document and take actions to eliminate food 
deserts. The U.S. 2014 Farm Bill appropriated $125 million each year for the Federal Healthy 
Food Financing Initiative (HFFI) to promote access to healthy foods in food deserts (Aussenberg 
2014). Many U.S. state and local governments have also introduced programs to improve food 
access by providing loans, grants and tax credits to subsidize grocery stores to enter food deserts 
among other policy interventions (CDC 2011). 
Despite the growing popularity of such programs, little is known about their welfare impact. 
I study the welfare impact of the entry of a low-cost grocery store into food deserts. I ask (1) how 
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do consumers make store choices and is there any heterogeneity in store preferences between 
food deserts (FD) and non-food deserts (NFD) residents? (2) what are the responses of stores in 
the county when a new grocery store comes to food deserts in the same county? (3) would the 
new low-cost grocery store operate profitably in food deserts when the government only gives 
the store one-time subsidy for the entry cost? 
To answer these questions, I use a multinomial mixed logit demand model (McFadden 1973; 
Berry 1994; McFadden and Train 2000) combined with a Nash-Bertrand price competition 
model (Berry et al. 1995 or BLP) to analyze the food store retail industry. After obtaining 
consumer preferences and cost parameters, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to see what 
happens when a low-cost grocery store comes to the most severe food desert in the county, 
which is defined as the low-access census block group with the highest poverty rate in the 
county. I use Walmart Neighborhood Market (WNM) as an example of a low-cost grocery store 
because WNM offers prices that are 10%-15% lower than an average grocery store, which may 
be particularly appealing to low-income consumers, and WNM is expanding fast in the U.S. 
recently, more than doubling the number of its stores from 2013 to 2015 fiscal year (Bowman 
2016), 43  
I use USDA’s new National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) 
combined with 2012 IRI InfoScan to estimate consumers’ food store choices and food stores’ 
pricing behavior and distribution of marginal costs. FoodAPS contains detailed information 
about the foods purchased or acquired by surveyed households for at-home consumption and 
away-from-home in 2012. Similar to existing studies such as Handbury et al. 2017 and Allcott et 
al. 2018, this paper focuses on the food-at-home purchases and acquisition. The 2012 
                                                
43 In particular, the pace of WNM expansion peaked in fiscal 2015 with 235 stores opened. From 2012 to 2016, 
WNM opening has made up a majority of Walmart’s U.S. store openings (Bowman 2016). 
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Information Resources Inc. (IRI) InfoScan records weekly barcode level sales and quantities sold 
in major food chain stores that cover over 80% of grocery purchases in the US. These data allow 
me to address limitations in the literature that are critical to understanding store choices and 
policy interventions to improve food access. 
Specifically, I make four key contributions to the literature. First, existing studies on food 
access and welfare only focus on the demand side, i.e. uncover consumers’ preferences for 
different store attributes and conduct counterfactual analysis to study how changing store 
characteristics affects consumers’ store choices and welfare (e.g. Taylor and Villas-Boas 2016; 
Allcott et al. 2018; Fan 2018). This is the first study that incorporates the supply side and allows 
the entry of a grocery store to not only affect food availability and distance, but also price 
charged by the retailers. Based on the Nash-Bertrand price competition model, I allow the prices 
of existing stores to change when a low-cost grocery store enters a food desert. Previous research 
suggests that price is the most important factor for consumers when choosing where to shop (e.g. 
Fan 2018). Thus incorporating price effect into the welfare analysis gives us a more accurate 
picture of the policy impact.  
Second, I include both producer and consumer surplus into the welfare analysis and compare 
the benefits of the policy intervention with the cost. In doing so, this paper is the first to conduct 
cost benefit analysis to assess the effectiveness of subsidizing grocery stores into food deserts, 
which has direct policy implications that concern hundreds of millions of dollars invested in 
improving food access every year. 
Third, using structural estimation and conducting policy simulations ex ante allows me to 
identify the causal impact of food access policy interventions on welfare. Public health literature 
on the effect of food access on food purchases largely infers the role of food environment from a 
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cross-sectional correlation between store density and food purchases (Cummins et al. 2005, 
Bodor et al. 2008, Sharkey et al. 2010). Recent research on the impact of supermarket entry on 
consumer food purchases uses an event study and household fixed effects to control for 
household-level invariant unobservables (e.g. Handbury et al. 2017; Allcott et al. 2018). 
However, changes in access may be correlated with time-varying household-level unobserved 
variables, which may bias the estimated effect of improved access.  
Fourth, I use two novel datasets with better representation of low-income households and 
food stores than existing studies on food deserts. Data constraints have restricted the ability of 
previous studies to focus on the store choices of target populations, such as low-income and 
SNAP participating households. One often-used dataset is Nielsen HomeScan (e.g. Handbury et 
al. 2017; Allcott et al. 2018) which has a large sample size but underrepresents low-income 
households (Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein 2009; Zhen et al. 2009). In contrast, the FoodAPS 
data are designed to be nationally representative of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP) households and non-participant households, which allows me to study the very 
households that various food deserts policies are concerned about. In addition, IRI InfoScan 
enables me to construct more accurate pictures of the individual retail environment in which the 
sample households live. First, the IRI InfoScan provides food prices, availability and geo-
coordinates of stores in major food chains that cover 80% of US grocery purchases, which is 
more representative than most data sources used in the literature such as Nielsen Retail 
Measurement Services (RMS) or Nielsen Kilts retail database. Second, because IRI InfoScan 
provides the geo-coordinates of each store, combined with the geo-locations of the FoodAPS 
households, it provides data on the precise distance between food stores visited and each 
household’s residence, as well as the number and types of stores close to each household. To the 
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best of my knowledge, IRI InfoScan is the most comprehensive data to depict the time-varying 
local food retail environment with detailed information on prices, variety and location in each 
week of the year. 
With these data, I employ a model of an oligopoly industry characterized by spatial 
competition between multi-store firms to study the welfare implications of supermarket entry. 
The model includes consumers’ demand and firms’ supply. First, I estimate consumer demand 
for food stores using multinomial mixed logit model (McFadden 1973; Berry 1994; McFadden 
and Train 2000). I specify that a consumer has several food outlet alternatives where she can 
acquire food, and those alternatives are defined as a bundle of perceived attributes—namely, 
time-invariant retail chain quality, prices, number of fruits and vegetables, and distance from 
home. This provides the framework to compute consumers’ willingness to pay for store 
attributes. After estimating the demand parameters, I specify the competition between food stores 
as Nash-Bertrand price competition, i.e. retail chains set the prices to maximize the firm-level 
profits given consumers’ demand for food stores. Lastly, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to 
see what happens when a low-cost grocery store comes to the most severe food desert in the 
county.44 When the grocery store comes to town, the prices of all incumbent stores would adjust 
to maximize firm-level profits and as a result induce changes in consumer and producer 
surplus.45 The social welfare in each county is the sum of consumer and producer surplus and is 
                                                
44 Specifically, I use a Walmart Neighborhood Market (WNM) as an example in the main analyses and I test the 
robustness of the result using another low-cost grocery store, Food 4 Less in the appendix. 
45 Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) suggest that lack of crowding in mixed logit models makes welfare calculations 
tend to overpredict gains from the introduction of new products (new stores in the paper). Thus this paper provides 
an upper bound of the welfare impact. 
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compared against the cost of the program to assess the feasibility of the policy to subsidize a 
low-cost grocery store to enter food deserts.46  
There are three central findings from the analyses. First, price is the most important attribute 
when consumers decide where to shop, especially for food deserts residents. Second, when 
WNM comes to the most severe food deserts in the county, food deserts residents have a bigger 
percentage increase in consumer welfare than non-food deserts residents. Meanwhile, larger 
grocery stores with bigger sales and stores closer to the new WNM are more negatively affected. 
Third, the annual average county-level welfare would rise by $219,810. However, the average 
annual increase in variable profit of the new WNM is only $123,957, which is less than the 
annual fixed costs of WNM and implies that WNM would lose money if it chose to operate in 
the most severe food deserts. Thus, despite the government subsidies to cover the entry costs of 
WNM to move into food deserts, WNM would find it unprofitable to operate in the most severe 
food deserts and thus calls into question the effectiveness of the policy. I find similar results 
using other low-cost grocery stores such as Food 4 Less.  
3.2 Data 
I use 2012 FoodAPS data combined with IRI InfoScan for the analyses. The FoodAPS survey 
collected detailed information about all foods purchased and acquired, from all food sources and 
by all household members, over the course of seven days. A total of 4,826 households completed 
the survey between April 2012 and January 2013. The primary respondent (PR) for each 
household-the main food shopper or meal planner- provided information about the household 
and household members through two in-person interviews. These interviews collected household 
demographics and information related to food purchases, intake and diet/health. In addition to 
                                                
46 The benefits measured in this paper are just in terms of consumer and producer welfare for food purchases, not in 
terms of taxes collected (sales/property), increased development/employment or any other benefits of having better 
retail environment in an area. 
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the in-person interviews, households were asked to scan barcodes on food, save their receipts 
from stores and restaurants, and record information in provided food books. Three phone calls 
with the PR occurred over the week to collect additional information.  
A unique feature of the FoodAPS data is that the survey was designed to be representative of 
SNAP households and nonparticipant households in three income groups: (1) income below 
100% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL); (2) income between 100 and 185% of FPL; and (3) 
income at or above 185% of FPL. The SNAP and low-income non-participant groups were 
oversampled to allow analysis of food spending and shopping behavior specifically for these 
groups, which has not always been possible with other data such as Nielsen HomeScan or IRI 
Consumer Panel. Understanding low-income households’ shopping behavior is important 
because various food desert policies are specifically targeting this population.  
The FoodAPS datasets also contain a geographic component that provides detailed 
information on local retail environment of each sample household. The geographic component 
not only includes distances for the food stores visited by the household during the week, it also 
contains distances for the food stores that each household could have visited in the resident 
county and adjacent counties. In particular, for five Food at Home (FAH) store types 1) 
Superstore, 2) Supermarket, 3) Grocery, 4) Combo Retail and 5) Convenience47, I have the 
distance from each household’s residence to the closest store of each type, as well the number of 
stores of each type within a one-mile radius. With these data I am able to construct 
comprehensive pictures of the local food environments in which the surveyed households live. 
                                                
47 Superstore includes large food retailers that combine a supermarket and a department store in the same 
establishment. Supermarket are large grocery stores with various food items and non-food household products, 
generally related to food items. Grocery Store includes retailers that are smaller than supermarkets and sell primarily 
or exclusively food items. Combo Retail includes dollar stores, drug stores, mass merchandisers and express grocery 
stores. Convenience includes retailers with extended hours, in convenient locations, stocking a limited range of 
household goods and food. 
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Previous studies, which were constrained by limited geographic data, were forced to examine 
retail environments at a much broader level such as number of establishments in a zip code, 
county or within 100 miles (e.g. Allcott et al. 2018; Kyureghian and Nayga 2013). 
In addition, crucial to the research question and empirical design, I can combine the 
FoodAPS datasets with store-level price and location data collected by the IRI. The store-level 
data or IRI InfoScan includes the average price charged as well as the aggregate quantity sold for 
each product at each store during each week. The IRI InfoScan covers major food chain stores 
that represent over 80% of grocery purchases in the US, which is more representative than most 
datasets used in the literature such as Nielsen Retail Measurement Services (53% coverage of 
grocery stores in Allcott et al. 2018) and Nielsen Kilts retailer data (15%-67% coverage 
depending on cities in Hottman 2014). All IRI stores that FoodAPS households visited can be 
identified and connected to the IRI InfoScan. Thus I can not only obtain the prices and selections 
of food provided in each IRI store the FoodAPS households visited, but also prices and selection 
of food in the IRI stores that each household could have visited in the county. The rich 
information of store-level prices and sales enables me to construct a credible profit function 
where firms maximize profits in each market (county-week), taking into account member stores 
both visited by FoodAPS households and those not visited.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of household weekly food store choices and 
household attributes. Only FoodAPS households that have visited IRI stores are included in this 
table.48 Only IRI stores are included in the analyses because there is no information about the 
prices and numbers of fruits and vegetables provided in non-IRI stores. The average household 
every week spends $70.7 per food store and takes 2.1 shopping trips to food stores. The average 
                                                
48 The FoodAPS households that have visited IRI stores are representative of all FoodAPS households overall.  
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distance from the household to a food store is 5.8 miles. Households spend 30% of food at home 
expenditure in a food store on average. The average store price and number of fruits and 
vegetables Universal Product Code (UPC) are $177.9 and 1,303, respectively. The price of a 
food store is calculated as the median cost of a basket of food following the Thrifty Food Plan 
(TFP). The TFP assigns weekly recommended consumption quantities of each food category 
based on the Dietary Guidelines for Americans and the My Pyramid Food Guidance System 
(CNPP 2007). The cost of TFP has direct policy implications to the extent that SNAP allocates 
monthly benefits based on the TFP cost. A full list of TFP categories and the weekly 
recommended pounds for a male aged 19 to 50 are provided in appendix C. Specifically, I 
choose the median price ($/lb) in each of the following six food categories “non-whole grain 
breads, cereal, rice etc”, “all potato products”, “fruit juices”, “all cheese”, “bacon, sausage and 
lunch meats” and “frozen entrees” to represent the median price in each of the six food types, i.e. 
grains, vegetables, fruit, milk products, meat and beans, and other foods. Then I multiply the 
median price for each food type with the total recommended pounds of consumption to construct 
the store-level median TFP cost as a proxy for store price.  
Table 1 also reports the average household attributes. The primary respondent (PR) of the 
households is 47 years old on average. About 23% of the PR are college graduates and 49% are 
married. About 58% of the PR are white, 21% are Hispanic and 14% are African Americans. The 
average household monthly income is $4,074. Eighty-eight percent of the households have 
access to car and 8% of households live in food deserts as defined by the USDA (USDA 2013). 
Specifically, a census block group is identified as a food desert if: (1) it is a “low-income 
community” based on having a poverty rate of 20% or greater; and (2) it is a “low-access 
community” based on the criteria that at least 33% or 500 people live more than 1 mile from a 
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supermarket49 or 10 miles in the case of rural census block groups. This food desert definition is 
used for two reasons. First, it is policy relevant because policy interventions such as HFFI use 
this definition to qualify projects targeted at food deserts. Second, it is commonly used in the 
literature so that the results can be compared to existing studies (Thomsen et al. 2015; Taylor and 
Villas-Boas 2016). 
Table 2 presents the average food retail environment variables by food deserts (FD) and 
non-food deserts (NFD) households. As can been seen in table 2, there are fewer households 
living in food deserts. FD Households earn less income, by $1,165 per month than NFD 
households. Furthermore, the nearest store of FD households has significantly fewer fruits and 
vegetables (226.0 vs. 665.2) than the nearest store NFD households.  
3.3 Model 
My general strategy is to first estimate consumers’ demand for different food stores while 
accounting for consumer heterogeneity in preferences using a model similar to Taylor and 
Villas-Boas (2016). Second, under the Nash-Bertrand price competition model, firms’ pricing 
decision depends on store-level demand as specified in the first step as in BLP (1995). Then 
marginal costs of each store can be estimated from the first order conditions of firm-level profit 
maximization. Third, after obtaining the demand and supply parameters, I simulate the welfare 
impact of the entry of low-cost grocery stores into the most severe food desert in each county 
and assess the feasibility of the government policy. 
3.3.1 The Demand Side 
I model household food store choices using a multinomial mixed logit model (McFadden 1973; 
Berry 1994; McFadden and Train 2000; Kyureghian and Nayga 2013; Taylor and Villas-Boas 
                                                
49 A supermarket is defined as a store that has over two million annual sales and has all major food departments 
(USDA 2013). 
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2016). The indirect utility of the consumer patronizing a store is a function of store attributes, 
heterogeneous consumer preferences, and unknown parameters. This modeling approach, 
combined with the representative sampling design in the FoodAPS data, enables the estimation 
of household utility for store attributes. It also provides a framework to compute household 
willingness to pay for different store attributes. 
The indirect utility of choosing store j in market t by household i is given by: 
 
Uijt =α t +α r + pjtα i + Xijtβi + ε ijt + µijt   (1) 
Retail chain dummy variables,  α r , capture any differences between retail chains that are 
time invariant; time dummy variables,  α t , control for changes over time (e.g, holidays and 
seasons) common to all food stores. The variable  p jt  is the price and  Xijt contains other 
attributes of store j in market t (a county-week), while  α i  and vector  βi represents the marginal 
utility placed on price and each of the X attributes, respectively. The error term  ε ijt captures the 
determinants of household marginal utility that are unobserved by the econometrician, but seen 
by the household when choosing stores, while  µijt captures all remaining (unobserved to all) 
determinants of utility. 
Distributional assumptions around  βi  and  µijt drive the econometric model choice. When 
 
µijt  follow independently and identically type I extreme value distribution, then we have a logit 
choice model. If we specify  βi = β + Ziσ z , then we have a mixed logit. The mixed logit model 
allows for preference heterogeneity by estimating an average (among the households) marginal 
utility with respect to the observed attributes, β , and also estimate a standard deviation from the 
mean marginal utility,  σ z , given  Zi household observable attributes. 
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The mean utility of outside option, all non-IRI stores, is normalized to zero. Assuming that 
households visit store j in market t that maximizes their utility, then the probability that store j is 
chosen is the probability that 
 
Uijt >Uikt  ∀k  50and is specified as below: 
 
prijt =
eα t+α r+ p jtα i+Xijtβi+ε ijt
1+ eα t+α r+ pktα i+Xiktβi+ε ikt
k=1
Ji
∑
  (2) 
where Ji denotes the choice set of each household i. The multinomial mixed logit model is 
estimated following the Berry (1994) approach to linearize the choice model equation. Taking 
the log of the probability of store j and subtracting the log of the probability of the outside option 
forms a linear equation to which I can apply ordinary least squares (OLS) or instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions: 
 
ln( prijt )− ln( priot ) =α t +α r + pjtα i + Xijtβi + ε ijt    (3) 
As the empirical analogue of probabilities, I will use the household expenditure shares on 
stores, such that I estimate: 
 
ln(sijt )− ln(siot ) =α t +α r + pjtα i + Xijtβi + ε ijt     (4) 
where  sijt is household i’s expenditure share made at store j in market t. Thus the store choice 
model is obtained by regressing the log difference of store-level expenditure shares relative to 
the outside option on the variables affecting indirect utility. 
                                                
50 One may be concerned that consumers choose several stores in a week for grocery shopping. Here I assume 
consumers choose one store at a time. If one is reluctant to accept this assumption, this model can be viewed as an 
approximation to the true choice model. An alternative is to explicitly model the choice of multiple stores as in 
Hendel (1999) or in Thomassen et al. (2017). 	
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3.3.2 Supply Side 
There are F multi-store retail chains competing in a Nash-Bertrand fashion: based on their stores 
and the prices and characteristics of competing stores, retail chains choose prices to maximize 
profits. Each retail chain f has some subset Jf stores of the J total stores in market t. For 
simplicity, t is omitted in all of the following equations.  
Each retail chain has a profit function 
 
∏ f = M ( pj −mcj )sj ( p, X ;θ )
j∈J f
∑             (5)  
where pj and mcj are the price and marginal cost of store j while M is the number of households 
in a market.  sj (⋅)  is store j’s predicted market share that aggregate the household level market 
shares to the store level and is calculated by 
 
s j = wi
i
∑ sij  where wi  is the sampling weight of 
household i. Total demand is  qj ( p, X ;θ ) = Msj ( p, X ;θ ).  The J first order conditions for profit 
maximization are given by 
 
sj ( p, X ;θ )+ ( pr −mcr )
∂sr ( p, X ;θ )
∂pj
= 0         
r∈J f
∑ (6)  
for j=1,…., J. This system of equations can be inverted to solve for the marginal costs that enter 
(5), or 
 mc = p − Δ( p, X ;θ )
−1s( p, X ;θ )               (7)  
where  Δ( p, X ;θ )  is the Jf x Jf matrix of own- and cross price share derivatives that has 
components of  ∂sr ( p, X ;θ ) / ∂pj . And the variables mc, p and  s( p, X ;θ ) are Jf x 1 vectors of 
marginal costs, prices, and market shares. 
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After estimating the mc of the stores visited by FoodAPS households based on the first order 
condition as described in equation (7), mc of other IRI stores not visited by FoodAPS households 
are predicted values of the OLS regressions.51 Food stores’ marginal cost is modeled as a log-
linear function of cost characteristics. The vector Wj represents the observed component (i.e. log 
count of fruits and vegetables UPC, county and week dummy variables) and  ω j  the unobserved 
component. Given these assumptions, the (log) marginal cost function can be written as 
 
ln(mcj ) =Wjτ +ω j               (8)  
where τ  is the vector of cost parameters. 
3.3.3 Counterfactual Analyses 
To evaluate the welfare impact of subsidizing a grocery store to enter a food desert, I simulate 
new equilibrium price vectors based on first order conditions in equation (7). I include all IRI 
stores even those not visited by FoodAPS households in the sample week because firms 
maximize firm-level profit that include both member stores visited by FoodAPS households and 
those not visited by FoodAPS households. A new equilibrium price vector p1 solves (7) for the 
counterfactual choice set (e.g., one with a new grocery store in the most severe food desert in a 
county). The new price vector p1 is then used to compute the change in variable profits under the 
counterfactual for each retail chain f, or  ∏ f ( p1,mc;θ )−∏ f ( p0 ,mc;θ ) , where p0 is the initial set 
of prices. Then 
 
∏ f ( p1,mc;θ )−∏ f ( p0 ,mc;θ )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
f
∑  gives the total change in producer variable 
profits/producer surplus/welfare.  
This counterfactual analysis is similar to Petrin (2002) but instead of removing one item 
(Minivan) from consumers’ car choice set, I add a new grocery store in consumers’ choice set. 
                                                
51 The results include only IRI stores visited by FoodAPS households are similar to results including IRI stores not 
visited FoodAPS households. 
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The price and number of fruits and vegetables provided by the new low-cost grocery store, i.e. 
Walmart Neighborhood Market will be the county-week average if there is already a WNM in 
the county. If there is no WNM in the county, then the region-week average prices and number 
of fruits and vegetables are used as the counterfactual levels provided in the WNM. The WNM is 
hypothesized to come to the most severe food desert in each county where most severe food 
deserts are low-access communities with highest poverty rate that policy makers are particularly 
concerned about.  
To calculate the impact of a low-cost grocery store coming to the most severe food deserts, 
on the consumers’ side, with the new equilibrium prices, the change in consumers i’s welfare is 
given by the change in the expected maximized utility  
 
ΔCSi = −
1
α i
log 1+ exp(α t +α r + pjtα i + Xijtβi )
j∈Ji+{g}
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
                       -- − 1
α i
log 1+ exp(α t +α r + pjtα i + Xijtβi )
j∈Ji
∑
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥                (9) 
where  α i is consumer i’s price sensitivity and g denotes the new grocery store that enters the 
food desert. Thus the total change in county-level consumers’ welfare is 
 
wiΔCSi
i
∑  where wi  is 
again the sampling weight of household i. 
3.3.4 Instruments 
Before discussing the results, there are three estimation concerns to address: (1) endogeneity of 
prices (2) unobserved store attributes correlated with distance; and (3) location endogeneity. 
First, retail chains set prices according to both observed and unobserved store characteristics 
that are imbedded in the error term in the indirect utility function, which makes prices 
endogenous. I use an approach similar to that used by Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001) and 
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exploit the panel structure of the data. A retail chain-specific dummy variable captures the 
characteristics that do not vary by market. Therefore, the identifying assumption is that, 
controlling for retail chain-specific means and demographics, county-specific valuations are 
independent across counties (but are allowed to be correlated within a county). Given this 
assumption, the prices of the retail chain in other counties are valid IV’s. The prices of the same 
retail chain in two counties will be correlated due to the common marginal cost, but due to the 
independence assumption will be uncorrelated with market-specific valuation. One could 
potentially use prices in all other counties and all quarters as instruments. I use regional weekly 
average prices of the same retail chain (excluding the county being instrumented). 
There are several possible situations when the independence assumption will not hold. 
Suppose there is national (regional) demand shock. For example, a New York Times report that a 
major food retailer routinely refuses to accept doctors’ notes, penalizes workers who need to take 
care of a sick family member and punishes employees for lawful absences may decrease the 
unobserved valuation of all stores of the food retailer in all counties, and the independence 
assumption will be violated. However, the results below concentrate on well-established retail 
chains for which it seems reasonable to assume there are less systematic demand shocks. In 
addition, aggregate shocks to the food store retail industry will be captured by time dummy 
variables. 
One may be concerned that local advertising and promotions are coordinated across county 
borders within a region, and these activities influence demand. Then the independence 
assumption will be violated for counties in the same region, and prices in counties in the same 
region will not be valid instruments. However, given the sample counties within the same region 
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are in different states and the size of the Census regions, this might be less of an issue. The larger 
the Census region the less likely is correlation with all counties in the region.  
 Suppose one believes that unobserved valuations differs by region and these differences 
affect demand. Then the independence assumption will be violated for counties in the same 
region, which results in the invalidity of IVs. For example, all western states may value stores 
with abundant organic and fresh produce more than Midwestern states. However, in order for 
this argument to hold, the difference in the valuation of stores has to be above and beyond what 
is explained by demographics and heterogeneity since both are controlled for. 
The second estimation concern relates to omitted variable bias due to unobserved store 
attributes correlated with distance. For example, a particular store may be chosen because it is 
close to the workplace, or because it is running a promotion that week. If not all of the store 
attributes are observed and these unobserved attributes are correlated with the observed distance 
chosen, then distance to store is endogenous due to these missing attributes. To address this 
potential missing variable bias, I instrument the distance from the household to a chosen store 
with the distance to the closest store of the given type following Taylor and Villas-Boas (2016). 
Since distance from home to the closest store of the given type is predetermined to the 
household’s week-to-week store choices, and thus cannot react to demand shocks, I argue that 
the instrument is exogenous to the omitted reasons why households choose one store over the 
another during the sample week. However, it is important to note that if the presence of stores 
close to where households live impacts store choice not only through distance e.g. the household 
works in the closest store and thus have employee discounts in the store, the exclusion 
assumption of the IV does not hold. 
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A final estimation concern, widely acknowledged in the store choice literature, is that 
household locations and store locations are endogenous. Retailers consider consumer 
characteristics when deciding where to locate, and households consider retail amenities when 
deciding where to live (Ver Ploeg et al. 2015). Kyureghian and Nayga (2013) address the 
potential endogeneity of retail environment variables with store choice by using lagged values of 
the retail environment. Alternatively, Currie et al. (2010) rely on the rich detail of their data to 
defend their identification, finding stores placement is uncorrelated with unobserved local 
demand shocks after controlling a large number of household and neighborhood controls. 
Although FoodAPS does not provide lagged values of the distance measures, it has remarkably 
rich household and food environment data. Thus I follow Currie et al. (2010) and choose a model 
that controls for a large array of household and local food environment variables. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1 Demand Estimates 
Table 3 presents the demand estimates in equation (4) from both OLS and IV specifications. The 
first column demonstrates the results from an OLS specification. The distance from home to 
store, store prices and number of fruits and vegetables, and the interactions terms with whether 
the household lives in a food desert are the explanatory variables in the model. The specification 
also includes week-in-year fixed effects to control for seasonality and a rich set of controls for 
household attributes as summarized in table 1. Column 2 contains the IV specification of column 
1, where distance to a given store is instrumented with distance to the nearest store of the store 
type52 and prices are instrumented by the average weekly regional price for the store chain and 
                                                
52 There are five store types Superstore, Supermarket, Grocery, Combo Retail and Convenience Stores. 
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exclude the store that is instrumented for. Column 3 repeats the IV specification in column 2 
without the week fixed effects and column 4 further removes the retail chain fixed effects. 
There are three important findings from table 3. First, the IVs are doing a relatively good job 
of removing bias and have strong power. In column (1), the coefficient on price is insignificant 
and the coefficient becomes significantly negative when IVs are used in column (2). This shift in 
significance and magnitude suggests that there are unobserved reasons why consumers do not 
choose the cheapest store and the instruments are correcting this positive omitted variable bias. 
However, instrumenting for store distance does not seem to have much of an effect on the 
estimated store distance coefficients. The magnitude of the coefficient on distance is similar 
between OLS and IV specifications with the coefficient from the IV model less precisely 
estimated. The first-stage F-statistics are very high in all IV specifications, suggesting that the 
instruments have power.53  
Second, it is important to control for retail chain fixed effects. When comparing across 
different IV specifications, I find that the results with and without week fixed effects are very 
similar. In contrast, the results with and without retail chain fixed effects differ a lot. In 
particular, the price and log count of fruits and vegetables coefficients become much smaller 
when retail chain fixed effects are excluded. It indicates that retail chain fixed effects have 
corrected a lot of positive omitted variable bias by accounting for the correlation between 
unobserved retail chain level quality and prices/number of fruits and vegetables UPCs. 
Third, there is heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for different store attributes. Based 
on the preferred IV specification in column (2), food deserts (FD) households are more price 
sensitive than non-food desert (NFD) households. NFD households prefer better selection of 
                                                
53 Because the equations are exactly identified, overidentification tests cannot be performed.  
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fruits and vegetables (FV) more than FD households although the difference is not statistically 
significant. Both FD and NFD households dislike long distance to stores but the estimates are not 
statistically different. The insignificant distance coefficient could indicate households do not pay 
much attention to distances when choosing where to shop. It is not completely unreasonable 
given that 85% of FD and 88% of NFD households have access to vehicle and the average 
household travels 5.8 miles to a store as shown in the summary statistics.54  
Price is the most important attribute when consumers decide where to shop, especially for 
FD households. The upper panel of table 4 presents the market share elasticities of store prices, 
number of FV UPCs and distance to home. The elasticities of prices are much bigger than those 
of FV and store distances, suggesting 1% increase in price will generate a much bigger change in 
consumers’ probability of visiting that store (market shares) than 1% increase in the number of 
FV provided and store distance. In addition, FD households have a more negative price elasticity 
than NFD households and thus price is even more important for FD households than NFD 
households.  
Consumers’ annual willingness to pay (WTP) for the number of FV provided in the store 
and the store distance is small. According to Fan (2018), consumers’ WTP for store attributes 
should take into account both the new probability of visiting the store given the marginal 
increase in store attributes (extensive margin) and conditional on visiting the store, consumers’ 
improved utility in dollar value due to the marginal increase in store attributes (intensive 
margin). The lower panel of table 4 shows that FD households are willing to pay $5.16 for 10% 
increase in the number of FV provided in the store compared to $9.75 for NFD households. The 
WTP for one-mile reduction in store distance is also small for both FD and NFD households 
                                                
54 Alternatively, one could argue that the insignificant coefficient on store distance could suggest that the sample 
size limits the power to detect the significance of the distance variable. However, the sample size is large enough to 
detect the significant coefficients on prices and log count of FV. 
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($6.78 and $2.70 respectively). It is due to both the small intensive and extensive marginal 
effects of improvement in the store selection of FV and distance to home. 
3.4.2 Supply Estimates 
Table 5 shows the store markup implied by the estimated model parameters. Specifically markup 
= (price-marginal cost)/price where marginal cost is estimated based on the first order conditions 
of retail chain level profit maximization as specified in equation (7). To get a sense of the 
plausibility of my parameter estimates, one can compare my markup estimates to retail markup 
estimates obtained using very different data and methods. For example, in the Census of Retail 
Trade, the average retail markup is 0.28 (Faig and Jerez 2005). In the Nielsen Kilts data, the 
median retail markup is 0.22 by Bertrand competition model and 0.25 by Cournot competition 
model (Hottman 2014). This is broadly comparable to what I estimate. 
3.4.3 Changes in Consumer Welfare 
I use compensating variation to measure changes in consumer welfare (consumer surplus) from 
the entry of a Walmart Neighborhood Market (WNM) into the most severe food desert in the 
county. The compensating variation measure is provided in equation (9). This cost-of-living 
index is the change in a consumer’s income that equates utility in a particular economic 
environment to some chosen benchmark utility (see Hicks 1946). For the benchmark I use the 
standard of living status quo. In the counterfactual environment, a WNM comes to the most 
severe food desert in the county, and other food store prices solve the set of equilibrium first-
order-conditions from equation (6). Compensating variation is the dollar amount a consumer 
would need to be just indifferent between the equilibrium with and without the WNM coming to 
the most severe food desert in town. Thus it is the dollar equivalent of the improved utility due to 
the WNM’s entry into food deserts.  
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FD households have a bigger percentage increase in consumer welfare when WNM comes to 
the most severe food desert in the county. Table 6 presents the change in annual household-level 
consumer welfare by household type when WNM enters the most severe food deserts. In 
particular, the NFD households experience a larger increase in consumer welfare in dollar value.  
But FD households have a lower base value of consumer welfare to start with, so the percentage 
increase in consumer welfare is greater for an average FD household compared to NFD 
households (55.7% vs. 50.1%). 
Furthermore, low-income households and households who live close to the new WNM 
experience a bigger increase in consumer welfare. Table 7 demonstrates the results of regressions 
of annual household-level consumer welfare change against log household income, log distance 
from home to store and the interaction term between log household income and vehicle access. 
The unit of observation in this regression is a household. The results show that a 100% increase 
in household income and distance to the new WNM leads to $18.19 and $73.48 less in consumer 
welfare increase, respectively. Thus low-income households and households closer to the new 
WNM benefits more from the entry of WNM into food deserts. Having access to vehicle 
dampens the effect of store distance on consumer welfare change but not statistically 
significantly. Thus whether having access to vehicle or not, closer households benefit more from 
the WNM entry into food deserts.  
3.4.4 Changes in Producer Welfare 
The incumbent large grocery stores respond to the WNM entry by decreasing prices significantly 
while other types of stores such as drug stores, convenience stores and dollar stores are 
responding less. Table 8 presents the equilibrium prices before and after WNM entry. The 
average store responds by decreasing prices by $13.1 (6.7%). The stores that lower prices the 
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most are the large grocery stores of similar size to WNM (between 10-20 million annual food 
sales) such as Randalls, Dillons and Weis Markets. In contrast, other types of stores including 
convenience stores (e.g. AMPM), drug stores (e.g. Albertsons/Sav-on), dollar stores (e.g. Bottom 
Dollar) and mass merchandisers (e.g. Super Target) are changing prices to a less extent in 
response to WNM entry into the food desert. 
In addition, the bigger stores and the stores closer to the new WNM are more negatively 
affected by the entry of WNM. Table 9 presents the regression results of change in store price, 
quantity as measured by the annual number of food baskets sold55 and variable profits against log 
of store sales and log of distance to the new WNM. The unit of the observation of the regression 
analyses is a store. I find that bigger stores in terms of sales lower prices further by $2.73 
compared to stores half the size in response to the WNM entry. As a result, bigger stores’ 
quantities sold do not decrease as much as smaller stores that do not lower the prices as much. 
However, the bigger stores are still hurting more from WNM entry given that the decrease in 
variable profits is larger for bigger stores. As expected, the stores closer to the new WNM lower 
prices more than stores that are farther away. However, the reduction in prices of closer stores 
does not generate enough increase in quantities sold because of the strong business stealing 
effect of the new WNM. The closer stores are more negatively affected in terms of variable 
profits, which is consistent with the findings of Arcidiacono et al. (2016) that Walmart 
Supercenter entry within one mile of an incumbent causes a sharp 16% drop in revenue and the 
effect decays quickly with distance 
                                                
55 The quantities sold are estimated using 
 
qj ( p, X ;θ ) = Msj ( p, X ;θ )  
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3.4.5 Total Welfare Change 
Overall on average, the total annual county level welfare is only $219,810 when WNM comes to 
the most severe food desert in the county. However, the new WNM may not find it profitable to 
operate there. The small overall welfare is due to the fact that the increase in consumer welfare is 
largely offset by the big decrease in producer welfare. Specifically, annual consumers’ welfare 
increases by $3,843,880 per county per year but incumbent stores’ loss of variable profits almost 
offset all of the increase in consumer welfare. In addition, the new WNM does not make a 
sizable variable profit, i.e. only $123,957 on average. In fact, the small variable profit made by 
WNM may not justify the entry of WNM even in the face of government subsidies for its entry 
cost. The fixed cost of a WNM is unknown in the literature but one can obtain a rough estimate 
by comparing to Walmart. The average area in a Walmart and a WNM are 125,000 and 43,000 
square feet, respectively. Because the area of a WNM is about one third of a Walmart and both 
retail chains belong to the same company, I can roughly estimate the fixed cost of a WNM to be 
also one third of that of Walmart. Zheng (2017) estimates the fixed cost of a Walmart to be 
$623,996 so a naïve estimate of fixed cost of WNM would be one third of it, which is $207,999. 
Because land/rent cost is not the only source of fixed costs and the land/rent cost per square feet 
may be more expensive when a smaller space is rented like WNM compared to a larger one like 
Walmart, $207,999 is probably a lower bound of the actual fixed cost for a WNM. Given the fact 
that the WNM would only make $123,957 every year when entering the most severe food desert, 
the meager variable profit is not going to offset even the lower bound of fixed cost. Thus, I 
conclude that the policy to subsidize WNM’s entry cost to move into the most severe food 
deserts as currently proposed by some HFFI projects is not going to be viable. This null effect is 
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also consistent with the economic intuition that WNM may have already known about the 
infeasibility of operating in the most severe food desert and thus choose not to open a store there. 
One may be wondering if this policy is only infeasible for WNM because of its large impact 
on incumbent stores. To test this hypothesis, I simulate the welfare impact of another low-cost 
grocery store, Food 4 Less to enter the most severe food desert in each county. The welfare 
impact results are shown in appendix F, which are similar to what I find in the case of WNM. 
Therefore, government subsidies for low-cost grocery stores to enter the most severe food deserts 
do not seem to be able to keep the business running on the daily basis.  
The small total welfare impact results from the small WTP of consumers for store proximity 
and number of fruits and vegetables provided as shown in table 4. Consumers have very small 
WTP for improvement in the number of fruits and vegetables and store proximity potentially 
because most consumers have access to vehicle and even low-income households spend over 
90% of food at home purchases in a big supermarket based on the FoodAPS data. In addition, 
Allcott et al. (2018) suggests that education and nutrition knowledge plays a big role in 
explaining the disparities in preferences for food purchases. Consistent with their findings, my 
result highlights the importance of the demand factors to changing consumers’ behavior.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the welfare impact of subsidizing low-cost grocery stores into the most severe 
food deserts. Some public health literature has documented that food deserts households face 
lower availability of healthy foods and have poor diets, obesity and other diet-related health 
problems. In some circles, this association has been taken as causal, with significant policy 
attention devoted to subsidizing low-cost grocery stores into food deserts. 
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I analyze the effectiveness of this policy using the structural estimation of demand and 
supply models in food retail industry. First, I use a multinomial mixed logit model to estimate a 
store-level demand system while allowing for heterogeneous consumer preferences. Second, I 
specify the price competition between food retail chains as Nash-Bertrand pricing game. Given 
the demand and spatial market structure of stores, the incumbent firms set prices for each of their 
own stores to maximize firm-level variable profits. According to this model, firms can have 
different prices across their own stores in equilibrium. Thus this model recognizes the multi-store 
nature of retailers and incorporates spatial differentiation and the cannibalization effects on the 
demand.  Third, using the estimated demand, prices and cost distributions for each retail chain, I 
simulate the welfare impact of the entry of a low-cost grocery store similar to Walmart 
Neighborhood Market into the most severe food deserts in each county. Entry of a grocery store 
enlarges the choice set of local consumers and shifts prices of existing stores. I obtain the new 
equilibrium price vectors based on our demand and supply model. The new prices are then used 
to quantify the impact on consumer and producer welfare. 
There are three central findings from the analyses. First, price is the most important store 
attribute when consumers decide where to shop, especially for food deserts (FD) households. 
Second, after a low-cost grocery store comes to the most severe food desert, FD households 
benefit more than NFD households. On the supply side, larger grocery stores and stores that are 
close to the incoming new grocery store are more negatively affected. Third, the average annual 
county-level social welfare increases by $219,810, in which consumer welfare increase by 
$3,843,880 and producer welfare decrease by $3,624,070. In addition, the fixed costs of 
operating a low-cost grocery store in the most severe food deserts is more than the variable profit 
obtained, thus casting doubt on the effectiveness of the one-time government subsidy of entry 
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cost for low-cost grocery stores to move into the most severe food deserts, which is in current 
policy proposals. This result is robust across various low-cost grocery retail chains including 
WNM and Food 4 Less.  
These results support a story in which food stores act rationally and maximize firm-level 
profits given the observed consumer demand. The firms already know about the lower demand in 
food deserts, which results in insufficient revenue to cover the cost of operating a store there. As 
a result low-cost grocery stores choose not to locate in the most severe food deserts. In 
conclusion, subsidizing low-cost grocery stores into the most severe food deserts may not be 
effective and changing consumers’ diets involves both improving retail food environment and 
demand. This paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the limitations of government 
subsidies to supermarket entry. This paper suggests an opportunity for future research to explore 
demand-side policies such as health education to improve preferences or increase SNAP benefits 
to relax budget constraints rather than focusing on moving grocery stores into the most severe 
food deserts alone.  
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3.6 Tables  
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean (Sd) 
Household Weekly Food Store Choices  
Expenditure ($) 70.7 (74.6) 
Number of trips 2.1 (1.5) 
Average distance traveled (miles) 5.8 (15.8) 
Expenditure shares in a food store (%) 29 (20) 
Store number of fruits and vegetables UPCs  1303 (969) 
Store prices ($) 177.9 (40.8) 
Number of household-stores 2,688 
Household Attributes  
Age 47.0 (16.1) 
College graduates 0.23 (0.42) 
Married 0.49 (0.50) 
Family size 2.97 (1.77) 
Has children 0.47 (0.50) 
White 0.58 (0.49) 
Hispanic 0.21 (0.41) 
African Americans 0.14 (0.34) 
American Indians and Alaska Native 0.01 (0.07) 
Asian 0.04 (0.21) 
Other race 0.02 (0.15) 
Household monthly income ($) 4074.0 (4253.8) 
Live in food deserts 0.08 (0.27) 
Access to vehicle 0.88 (0.32) 
Number of households 1,808 
Notes: the age, college education, marital status and race are the characteristics of the primary 
respondent of the household. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Food Retail Environment 
 
 Food Deserts Non-Food Deserts 
Household monthly income ($) 3,002* 
(2,762) 
4,167 
(4,347) 
Access to vehicle 0.85 
(0.35) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
Distance to the nearest 
supermarket (miles) 
1.87 
(3.67) 
1.68 
(2.42) 
Number of fruits and vegetables 
UPCs in the nearest store 
226.0* 
(451.4) 
665.2 
(871.6) 
Price of the nearest store ($) 212.6 
(59.8) 
205.4 
(56.5) 
Number of households 139 1,528 
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Table 3.2 (cont.) 
Notes: * denotes the difference between food deserts and non-food deserts is statistically 
significant at 5%. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Demand Estimates 
 
Variables OLS  
(1) 
IV 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
IV 
(4) 
Distance  -0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
Distance * FD 0.012 
(0.016) 
-0.016 
(0.025) 
-0.007 
(0.022) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
Price -0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.056*** 
(0.021) 
-0.058*** 
(0.022) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Price * FD -0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.033) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Log count of FV UPCs 0.406 
(0.303) 
0.533* 
(0.326) 
0.580* 
(0.346) 
0.345*** 
(0.053) 
Log count of FV UPCs * 
FD 
-0.135 
(0.137) 
-0.206 
(0.136) 
-0.197 
(0.135) 
-0.037 
(0.126) 
Week FE Y Y N N 
Store Chain FE Y Y Y N 
First stage F-Test -- 546.0 542.1 540.6 
No. of Observations 2,688 2,688 2,688 2,688 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) level and reported in the parentheses. FD, FV, 
UPC and FE stand for food deserts, fruits and vegetables, Universal Product Code and fixed 
effects. All regressions include household attributes documented in table 1. Distance is 
instrumented with distance to the nearest store of the given store type. Prices are instrumented by 
the average weekly regional price for the store chain and exclude the store that is instrumented 
for. 
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Table 3.4 Elasticities and Annual Household Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Store Attributes 
 
 
Price FV  Distance  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Elasticities    
FD -2.52 0.07 -0.03 
NFD -2.17 0.12 -0.01 
WTP    
FD -- $5.16 -$6.78 
NFD -- $9.75 -$2.70 
Notes: All elasticities correspond to 1% increase in price, number of FV UPCs and distance in 
miles. The WTP represents consumers’ willingness to pay for 10% increase in number of FV 
UPCs and one-mile increase in distance to stores, respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 Distribution of Store Markup Estimates 
 
Percentile Markup 
1 -0.09 
5 -0.02 
10 0.02 
25 0.08 
50 0.14 
75 0.20 
90 0.27 
95 0.32 
99 0.38 
Notes: markup is calculated as (price-marginal cost)/price 
 
Table 3.6 Change in Household-Level Consumer Welfare Per Year When Walmart 
Neighborhood Market Enters the Most Severe Food Deserts 
 
 Consumer Welfare Change Percentage Change 
All $1132 ($526) 
50.5% 
(60.2%) 
FD $1003 ($368) 
55.7% 
(56.5%) 
NFD $1144 ($537) 
50.1% 
(60.5%) 
Notes: mean (standard deviations) are presented in the table. 
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Table 3.7 Heterogeneity in Annual Household-Level Consumer Welfare Change 
 
 Household-Level Consumer Welfare Change 
Log income -18.19** (7.33) 
Log distance -73.48*** (14.68) 
Log distance * vehicle access 4.75 (15.42) 
No. of Observations 1,664 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The unit of 
observation is household.  
 
Table 3.8 Equilibrium Prices Pre and Post Walmart Neighborhood Market Entry 
 
 Price   
 Pre Post Δ Price % Δ Price 
Mean 215.8 202.7 -13.1 -6.7 
Median 226.4 215.4 -11.0 -6.0 
 A. Largest Price Decrease on Entry 
Randalls 213.2 161.4 -51.9 -24.3 
Dillons 168.6 125.7 -42.8 -25.4 
Weis Markets 172.9 137.9 -35.0 -20.2 
Food Maxx 131.7 100.5 -31.2 -23.7 
Tops Friendly Markets 166.6 136.7 -29.8 -17.9 
 B. Smallest Price Decrease on Entry 
Super Target 150.9 145.2 -5.7 -3.8 
Nob Hill Foods 199.5 195.6 -3.9 -2.0 
Bottom Dollar 116.3 113.3 -3.0 -2.6 
Albertsons/Sav-on 189.9 193.2 3.3 1.8 
AMPM 340.8 345.7 4.9 1.4 
Notes: the mean and median prices correspond to individual store levels while the largest price 
decrease and increase figures are at firm level. 
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Table 3.9 Heterogeneity in Store Responses 
 
 Δ Price Δ Quantity Δ Variable Profits 
Log sales -2.73*** (0.09) 
92.72*** 
(13.81) 
-19130.79*** 
(316.72) 
Log distance 1.28*** (0.14) 
-55.06** 
(21.89) 
1032.50** 
(501.96) 
No. of Observations 6901 6901 6901 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. The unit of 
observation is a store. Quantity and variable profits correspond to the annual number of food 
baskets sold and variable profits generated in a store. 
 
 
Table 3.10 Annual Average County-Level Welfare Impact of Walmart Neighborhood 
Market Entry into Most Severe Food Deserts 
 
 Welfare Change Percentage Change 
Change in Consumer Welfare $3,843,880 
($8,111,969) 
90.3% 
(86.1%) 
Change in Variable Profits -$3,624,070 
($9,003,280) 
-40.2% 
(30.0%) 
Incumbent Stores -$3,748,027 
($9,010,677) 
-60.8% 
(15.7%) 
New Walmart Stores $123,957 
($74,060)  
Total Welfare $219,810 
($1,622,568) 
26.3% 
(34.1%) 
Notes: mean (standard deviations) are presented in the table. 
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CONCLUSION 
My dissertation contributes to the rising debate in academic and policy-making circles on 
how to improve the quality of food purchases and consumption by changing the food geography 
in the United States. Specifically, it aims to understand the nature, causes, and impact of living in 
a U.S. food desert.  
In the first chapter, I focus on the disparity in food prices and availability between food 
deserts and non-food deserts. I use over 10 billion weekly barcode-level store scanner data (IRI 
InfoScan) in 2012 to create a census-tract level Exact Price Index or EPI (Handbury and 
Weinstein 2014). The EPI addresses two critical issues that have plagued the spatial price index 
measurement. One is product heterogeneity, i.e. different goods are compared in different 
locations; the other is variety bias, i.e. some goods are unavailable in some locations. I find that 
the prices of commonly available foods are similar between food deserts and non-food deserts. 
However, because food deserts have significantly fewer food options available, further 
controlling for the variety bias shows that food prices are actually 3.5% higher in food deserts. In 
addition, the paper shows that this 3.5% price difference found between food deserts and non-
food deserts is driven by a lack of supermarkets. Finally, the paper shows that income and 
poverty rates are more important than access in determining store prices. My research highlights 
the importance of addressing both product heterogeneity and variety bias when prices are 
compared across food deserts and non-food deserts. Given the small price difference between 
low and high access areas, entry of supermarkets in supply side policies may have limited effects 
on enabling a more affordable basket of a wide array of food products.  
In my second paper, I ask whether better availability of fruits and vegetables in food deserts 
improves consumer welfare. I use IRI InfoScan and consumer demographic data to estimate a 
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random coefficient discrete choice demand system for food stores. This demand model is very 
flexible and allows for heterogeneous consumer preferences for different store attributes while 
addressing the endogeneity of store prices and offerings. After obtaining demand parameter 
estimates, I quantify the welfare impact of policies that change two store attributes ex ante. The 
first increases the availability of fruits and vegetables; the second lowers the prices of fruits and 
vegetables at existing stores in food deserts. This is the first paper that evaluates the welfare 
impact of policies aimed at food deserts. I find that prices are more important than the 
availability of fruits and vegetables and store proximity for both consumers in food deserts and 
non-food deserts. Expanding the availability of fruits and vegetables in the nearest stores of food 
deserts does not greatly change consumers’ store choices or enhance consumer welfare. In 
contrast, price subsidy programs have the potential to significantly improve consumer welfare in 
food deserts. Specifically a 10% fruits and vegetables price reduction generates an increase in 
consumer welfare by $51 per household per year while the cost of the program is only $25 per 
household per year. 
In my third paper, I study the impact on consumer and producer welfare of a low-cost 
grocery store arrival in a food desert. Building on the demand model in my job market paper, I 
incorporate supply-side price competition in the structural model, include producer surplus in the 
welfare analysis, and consider the full effect of a new grocery store entry. I use data from U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Acquisition and Purchases Survey (FoodAPS), which 
records household-level food store choices and IRI InfoScan to estimate both demand and supply 
parameters. I specify the price competition between firms as a Nash-Bertrand pricing game, 
which assumes that given consumer demand, the incumbent firms set prices for each of their own 
stores to maximize firm-level profits. After obtaining the demand and supply side parameters, I 
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conduct a simulation analysis of a government subsidy to encourage a Walmart Neighborhood 
Market to enter the most severe food desert in each sample county. I find that average annual 
county-level social welfare increases by $3,843,880, all of which comes from the jump in 
consumer welfare. However, an average Walmart Neighborhood Market store would find it 
unprofitable to operate in the most severe food deserts, which calls into question the 
effectiveness of the policy to subsidize a low-cost grocery store to enter the most severe food 
deserts. 
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APPENDIX A. THEORETICAL MODEL 
We follow the theoretical model of Broda and Weinstein (2010) and Handbury and Weinstein 
(2014) to adjust for variety in food price indices. The Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
utility of a representative consumer who lives in local market c is denoted by equation (B1). 56 
Uc = Xgc( )
σ
σ −1
g∈Gc
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⎡
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⎢
⎤
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In equation (B1), Xgc is the consumption of food group g in local market c. σ  is the 
elasticity of substitution across food groups. The variable Gc is the set of all food groups 
available in local market c. Then Xgc is defined in equation (B2) 
Xgc = Xbgc( )
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The consumption of food group g in local market c, Xgc is defined in (B2) where σ ga  is the 
elasticity of substitution across brand-products within a food group and the set of all brand-
products available in food group g in local market c is denoted as Bgc. The consumption of brand-
product b of food group g in local market c, Xbgc, is defined in equation (B3) where dubgc is the 
taste parameter or utility weight associated with UPC u of brand-product b from food group g in 
                                                
56 The CES assumption makes the price indices estimable and tractable. This assumption is also constantly used in 
many economic geography models such as Krugman (1991). Moreover, Feenstra and Weinstein (2010) show the 
CES utility function has similar price levels to translog (a second-order approximation of an arbitrary expenditure 
system). Therefore, the CES assumption is unlikely to alter the results substantively. 
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local market c.57 The elasticity of substitution between UPCs within brand-products is σ gw  and 
the set of all UPCs in brand-product b food group g is Abgc. The implicit assumption is that the 
elasticity of substitution within brand-product σ gw  is the same across brand-products within a 
food group. Moreover, the elasticity of substitution across brands of the same product within a 
food group σ ga  is also assumed to be constant across all brand-products within a food group. So 
we have a constant σ gw  and σ ga  for each food group. 
Then the minimum cost function of achieving one unit of subutility (3) is derived in equation 
(B4) 
 Cbgc =
Pubgc
dubgc
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−σ gw
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1−σ gw
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Similarly, the minimum unit cost functions of subutility (2) and (1) are derived in equation 
(B5) and (B6) 
Cgc = Cbgc( )1−σ g
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We assume consumers have homogeneous tastes towards UPC u across local markets, which 
indicates that dubgc is constant across the nation and dubgc equals dubgn.58 Then based on the 
minimum unit cost in (B4), the national expenditure share of UPC u available in local market c 
                                                
57 Although Broda and Weinstein (2010) and Handbury and Weinstein (2014) treat dubgc as the measure of quality of 
the UPC u, we think of dubgc as the taste parameter or utility weight associated with UPC u. Because the variable dubgc 
is essentially how much utility the representative consumer can get from the consumption of one unit of UPC u. 
58 This assumes that households in different local markets have the same taste towards foods. This is the similar 
assumption that Feenstra (1994), Broda and Weinstein (2010) and Handbury and Weinstein (2014) use.	
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in a particular brand-product b can reflect the utility-adjusted price of the UPC. This is illustrated 
in equation (B7) and (B8). 
Subgn =
Pubgc / dubgc
Cbgc
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1−σ gw
   (B7) 
ln Pubgcdubgc
=
lnSubgn
1−σ gw
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ lnCbgc  (B8) 
In equation (B8), the utility-adjusted prices of UPCs are indexed as Pubgc / dubgc . The 
elasticities of substitution within brand-products are greater than 1 given that brand-products are 
substitutes rather than complements within a food group. The national expenditure share Subgc can 
reflect the utility-adjusted prices in local market c. For example, if there are two UPCs that exist 
in brand-product b with the same price, but only the UPC with lower national expenditure share 
is available in local market c, then it indicates that the UPC available in the local market is less 
important than the other UPC in providing utility to the consumer. Then based on the minimum 
cost of subutility function Pubgc and national expenditure shares Subgn, Feenstra’s (1994) and 
Handbury and Weinstein’s (2014) critical insight is that obtaining the relative minimum unit cost 
(Pubgc/ Pubgn) between a local geographical scale such as census tract and the whole nation will 
eliminate the quality parameter dubgc and thus yield the variety-adjusted prices in each census 
tract. 
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APPENDIX B. SATO AND VARTIA WEIGTHS AND NATIONAL EXPENDITURE 
SHARES 
 
The log ideal CES Sato and Vartia (1976) weights are   
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where Muc, Mbc, Mgc are local market shares of UPC u, brand-product b and food group g. The set 
Ub is the set of all UPCs that belong to the brand-product b, Bg is the set of all brand-products 
that belong to the food group g and G is the set of all 29 TFP food groups. We define Muc, Mbc 
and Mgc as 
Muc =
Vuc
Vuc
u∈Ub
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Vuc
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∑ ,
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∑  
where Vuc is the sales on UPC u in local market c. Similarly, the national market shares of UPC 
u, brand-product b and food group g are 
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Mu =
Vu
Vu
u∈Ub
∑  , Mb =
Vu
u∈Ub
∑
Vu
u∈Ub
∑
b∈Bg
∑ ,
 
Mg =
Vu
u∈Ub
∑
b∈Bg
∑
Vu
u∈Ub
∑
b∈Bg
∑
g∈G
∑  
The national expenditure shares on UPCs of brand-product b that are available in local 
market c are 
 
Sbc =
Vuc
c
∑
u∈Ubc
∑
Vuc
c
∑
u∈Ub
∑    (B.4) 
where the variable Ubc denotes the set of all UPCs that belong to brand-product b and exist in 
local market c and Ub is the set of all UPCs in brand-product b nationally. The variable Vuc is the 
sales of UPC u in local market c. 
Similarly, the national expenditure shares on brand-products that belong to food group g and 
are available in local market c is 
 
Sgc =
Vbc
c
∑
b∈Bgc
∑
Vbc
c
∑
b∈Bg
∑    (B.5)
 
where the variable Bgc is the set of all brand-products in food group g in local market c and Bg is 
the set of all brand-products in food group g nationally. The sales on brand-product b in local 
market c are Vbc. 
To simplify the calculation of variety adjustment (VA), Handbury and Weinstein (2014) 
aggregate the expenditure across UPCs within a food group and estimate a common Sbc within 
each food group. In other words, Sgc is a measure of the average availability of UPCs within a 
brand-product in local market c. Therefore the group-specific variety adjustment is given by 
VAgc = (Sgc )
1
1−δ ga (Sgc )
1
1−δ gw
            (B.6)  
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where we do not need to use Wbc to weight the national expenditure shares on brand-products 
available in local market c, Sbc. 
The national expenditure shares on food groups available in local market c is 
 
Sc =
Vgc
c
∑
g∈Gc
∑
Vgc
c
∑
g∈G
∑    (B.7)
 
where the variable Gc is the set of all food groups in local market c and G is the set of all 29 TFP 
food groups. The sales of food group g in local market c are Vgc.
 Based on the national expenditure shares, we calculate the across food group variety index in 
(B.8) and within food group variety index (B.9). 
         VA1= Sc
1
1−σ          (B.8) 
        
 
VA2 = Sgc( )
1
1−σ a Sgc( )
1
1−σ w
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
Wgc
g∈Gc
∏       (B.9) 
where the Sgc and Sc are national expenditure shares as indicated in equations (B.5) and (B.7). 
The elasticities of substitution within and across brand products are 
 
σ g
w  and 
 
σ g
a . Lastly the Sato 
and Vartia food group weight is Wgc in equation (B.3). 
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APPENDIX C. TFP FOOD GROUPS AND WEIGHTS 
Food Type Food Category 
Pounds Per Week for 
Males Age 19-50 
Grains 
Whole grain bread, rice, pasta, pastries (incl 
whole grain flours) 2.82 
Grains Whole grain cereals incl hot cereal mixes 0.08 
Grains Popcorn and other whole grain snacks 0 
Grains 
Non-whole grain breads, cereal, rice, pasta, pies, 
pastries, snacks, and flours 1.66 
Vegetables All potato products 2.48 
Vegetables Dark green vegetables 1.24 
Vegetables Orange vegetables 0.98 
Vegetables 
Canned and dry beans, lentils, and peas or 
legumes 1.87 
Vegetables Other vegetables 2.7 
Fruit Whole fruit 6.65 
Fruit Fruit juices 1.76 
Milk products Whole milk, yogurt, and cream 0.55 
Milk products Low-fat and skim milk and low-fat yogurt 10.75 
Milk products All cheese, incl cheese soups and sauces 0.07 
Milk products Milk drinks and milk desserts 0 
Meat and 
beans Beef, pork, veal, lamb, and game 0.63 
Meat and 
beans Chicken, turkey, and game birds 2.55 
Meat and 
beans Fish and fish products 0.17 
Meat and 
beans 
Bacon, sausage, and lunch meats including 
spreads 0.02 
Meat and 
beans Nuts, nut butters, and seeds 0.26 
Meat and 
beans Egg and egg mixtures 0.36 
Other foods Table fats, oils, and salad dressings 0.99 
Other foods Gravies, sauces, condiments, and spices 0.99 
Other foods Coffee and tea 0.01 
Other foods 
Soft drinks, sodas, fruit drinks, and ades incl rice 
beverages 0 
Other foods Sugars, sweets, and candies 0.08 
Other foods Soups (ready-to-serve and condensed) 0.16 
Other foods Soups (dry) 0.02 
Other foods 
Frozen/refrigerated entrees incl pizza, fish sticks, 
and frozen meals 0.01 
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APPENDIX D. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In our last robustness test, we study the representativeness of IRI data and explore the effect 
of IRI store coverage on the results. In table D5, we compare the numbers and sales in IRI and 
TDLinx stores by census tract types in 2012. The TDLinx contains the names, characteristics, 
annual sales and geo-coded locations of 269,674 food stores across the U.S. in 2012. We find 
that the IRI has a good representation of store counts of club stores (99%), mass merchandisers 
(98%), dollar stores (93%) and drug stores (86%). But the coverage of grocery stores (74%) and 
convenience stores (53%) is lower.  
Specifically, convenience stores are more underrepresented in food deserts than all types of 
non-food deserts (41% vs 49%, 60% and 56%). It is less of a concern in our price comparisons 
because all of the census tracts in our contiguous sample have at least one IRI store nearby. 
Suppose the existing IRI store is a convenience store, then due to competition effects, both the 
CEPI and VA of the food desert based on one IRI convenience store will not greatly differ from 
that based on two convenience stores if we had data on the non-IRI convenience store. If the 
existing IRI store is a supermarket that offers much wider variety and lower prices, then missing 
the non-IRI convenience store will not greatly affect the local food price. 
However, under-coverage of grocery stores will have a big impact on our price indices since 
grocery stores have a wide selection of foods at lower prices. We find that in table D5 the 
grocery stores coverage (74%) in food deserts is higher than LIHA tracts (64%). Because we find 
that supermarkets charge lower EPI from table 5, the better coverage of grocery stores in food 
deserts suggest that we may underestimate the variety and price difference between food deserts 
and LIHA tracts in all of our analysis. In contrast, because IRI tends to cover fewer grocery 
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stores in food deserts than HILA tracts (74% vs 85%), the variety and price difference between 
food deserts and HILA tracts is likely to be overestimated. 
The use of IRI data does affect the size of our sample census tracts but because of the small 
portion of census tracts we drop, it does not change our results. We drop 556 census tracts 
(5.1%) of the 10,959 urban census tracts with non-zero population in our sample because there 
are no IRI stores within the census tracts or their contiguous census tracts. Among the 556 
dropped census tracts, 267 do not have any TDLinx or IRI stores while 289 (2.6% of the total) 
have TDLinx stores but no IRI stores. Because the methods we use indicate the areas without any 
foods have positively infinite prices, these census tracts are, therefore, not included in our 
analyses. The share of food deserts, LIHA, HILA, HIHA tracts remain the same in the sample 
after wen drop 556 tracts, suggesting we do not oversample or undersample any type of tracts.  
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Table D1. Regressions on EPI-Without County Fixed Effects 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.039*** 
(0.006) 
Median Family Income 0.035*** 
(0.008) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.050*** 
(0.013) 
Poverty Rate 0.063*** 
(0.022) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
0.129** 
(0.052) 
Observations 10,367 10,367 10,367 
 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are also included. Median family income is in log. 
 
 
Table D2. Regressions on EPI–Within Brand Elasticity of Substitution (σ gw )  =7, Across 
Brand Elasticity of Substitution (σ ga )=4 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.062*** 
(0.009) 
Median Family Income 0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
0.043*** 
(0.013) 
Poverty Rate 0.086*** 
(0.017) 
0.195*** 
(0.056) 
0.281*** 
(0.064) 
Observations 10,367 10,367 10,367 
 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are also included. Median family income is in log. 
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Table D3. Regressions on EPI–Without Radom Weights Items  
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
Median Family Income 0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Poverty Rate 0.095*** 
(0.017) 
0.078*** 
(0.017) 
0.173*** 
(0.029) 
Observations 10,367 10,367 10,367 
 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are also included. Median family income is in log. 
 
 
Table D4. Regressions on EPI–Based on Two Mile Buffer Zones 
 
 Log CEPI Log VA Log EPI 
Low Food Access 0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.0004) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Median Family Income 0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Poverty Rate 0.081*** 
(0.010) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.100*** 
(0.012) 
Observations 10,161 10,161 10,161 
 
Notes: *,**,*** denotes significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at the PSU level and included in the parentheses. Race, gender, marriage, age, 
education, population density in the census tracts and contiguous census tracts as well as county 
fixed effects are also included. Median family income is in log. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Table D5. IRI Coverage in Store Counts and Sales at Census-Tract Level 
 Overall Food Deserts 
(Low Income 
Low Access) 
Low Income 
High Access 
High Income 
Low Access 
High Income 
High Access 
IRI Coverage in 
Store Counts 
     
Club stores 
 
0.99 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
0.99 
(0.09) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
Dollar stores 
 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.90 
(0.28) 
0.93 
(0.24) 
0.94 
(0.24) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Convenience stores 
 
0.53 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.47) 
0.49 
(0.49) 
0.60 
(0.48) 
0.56 
(0.49) 
Grocery stores 
 
0.74 
(0.43) 
0.74 
(0.43) 
0.64 
(0.47) 
0.85 
(0.35) 
0.77 
(0.41) 
Mass merchandisers 
 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.15) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
Drug stores 
 
0.86 
(0.33) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
0.83 
(0.36) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
0.87 
(0.32) 
IRI Coverage in 
Store Sales 
     
Club stores 
 
0.99 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
0.99 
(0.08) 
0.99 
(0.09) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
Dollar stores 
 
0.93 
(0.28) 
0.91 
(0.49) 
0.93 
(0.25) 
0.93 
(0.24) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
Convenience stores 
 
0.57 
(0.92) 
0.43 
(0.51) 
0.50 
(0.58) 
0.66 
(1.01) 
0.63 
(1.17) 
Grocery stores 
 
0.75 
(0.44) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.86 
(0.34) 
0.79 
(0.44) 
Mass merchandisers 
 
0.98 
(0.14) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
Drug stores 
 
0.89 
(0.41) 
0.90 
(0.38) 
0.86 
(0.43) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
0.89 
(0.47) 
Observations 10,959 983 3,777 2,204 3,995 
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses. Food deserts definition 1 is used. When there 
are zero IRI and TDLinx stores in a census tract, then the IRI sales/counts coverage is 1. The 
calculations of IRI store coverage exclude tracts that have zero TDLinx stores but non-zero IRI 
stores (i.e. these tracts have missing IRI store coverage). As a result, 63, 17, 37, 5 and 13 tracts 
are excluded for IRI shares calculations of convenience stores, drug stores, dollar stores, mass 
merchandisers and grocery stores. So the IRI coverage in the table is lower bounds of the actual 
IRI coverage. The number of observations for each type of census tracts does not count the 
number of excluded tracts by each store type.  
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APPENDIX E. ROBUSTNESS TESTS FOR CHAPTER TWO 
 
Table E1. Results from Full Model—Using Prices of A Basket of Commonly Available 
Food 
 
Variables Means 
( β 's ) 
Standard 
Deviations 
Interaction with Demographic 
Variables 
  ( σ 's ) Vehicle Access Log Income 
Price -2.186*** 
(0.219) 
0.014 
(0.021) 
 0.059*** 
(0.006) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
1.014*** 
(0.122) 
0.005 
(1.306) 
 0.051*** 
(0.007) 
Store size  0.008*** 
(0.003) 
   
Log distance to store -0.598** 
(0.292) 
0.009 
(0.146) 
0.139*** 
(0.052) 
-0.056*** 
(0.017) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. 
 
 
Table E2. Results from Full Model—Using Variety-Adjusted Price Index 
 
Variables Means 
( β 's ) 
Standard 
Deviations 
Interaction with Demographic 
Variables 
  ( σ 's ) Vehicle Access Log Income 
Price -1.254*** 
(0.360) 
0.253 
(0.288) 
 0.132* 
(0.087) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
1.451*** 
(0.219) 
0.304 
(1.012) 
 0.442*** 
(0.115) 
Store size  -0.001 
(0.003) 
   
Log distance to store -0.116** 
(0.050) 
0.166 
(1.253) 
0.123*** 
(0.034) 
-0.150*** 
(0.046) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. 
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Table E3. First Stage Results of IV Logit Model 
 
Variables Price Log count of fruits 
and vegetables 
Distance to the nearest distribution center -1.158** 
(0.479) 
0.066** 
(0.034) 
Distance to the nearest distribution center X 
Quarterly regional banana price 
1.769*** 
(0.497) 
-0.089** 
(0.037) 
Population density in 1000 people per sq mile 0.008 
(0.137) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
Housing value per square feet -0.061 
(0.084) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
Store size 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
F-test 12.02 10.19 
No. of Observations 2,668 2,668 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects.  
 
Table E4. Results from Full Model—Interacting Vehicle Access with Count of FV UPCs 
 
Variables Means 
( β 's ) 
Standard 
Deviations 
Interaction with Demographic 
Variables 
  ( σ 's ) Vehicle Access Log Income 
Price -0.192*** 
(0.025) 
0.014 
(0.025) 
 -0.070 
(0.062) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
0.200 
(0.159) 
0.322*** 
(0.077) 
-0.208 
(0.154) 
0.076 
(0.212) 
Store size  0.008*** 
(0.003) 
   
Log distance to store 0.154 
(0.466) 
0.271 
(1.341) 
0.504*** 
(0.186) 
-0.382 
(0.456) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. 
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Table E5. Average Changes in Fruit and Vegetables Sales Shares Per County  
 
No. of FV 
UPCs Change in Sales Shares 
50 0.08 pp 
100 0.09 pp 
250 0.10 pp 
350 0.10 pp 
1200 0.13 pp 
Notes: pp stands for percentage points. The counterfactual policy is to increase the number of 
fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store of each food deserts census tract to 
different levels as indicated in the No. of FV UPCs. The calculation is based on the assumption 
that all increased market shares in intervene stores go to fruits and vegetables (FV) while all 
decreased market shares go to non-FV. 
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Table E6. Regional Heterogeneity in Demand Estimation 
 
Variables Means 
( β 's ) 
Standard 
Deviations 
Interaction with Demographic 
Variables 
  ( σ 's ) Vehicle Access Log Income 
Northeast     
Price -0.212*** 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
 0.042*** 
(0.009) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
1.681*** 
(0.076) 
0.044 
(0.156) 
 0.268*** 
(0.058) 
Store size  0.008 
(0.011) 
   
Log distance to store -0.264** 
(0.104) 
0.245** 
(0.124) 
0.049 
(0.115) 
-0.053 
(0.170) 
Midwest     
Price -0.563*** 
(0.099) 
0.017 
(0.176) 
 0.052 
(0.052) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
0.543*** 
(0.369) 
0.128 
(0.919) 
 0.185** 
(0.090) 
Store size  -0.002 
(0.005) 
   
Log distance to store -0.089 
(0.231) 
0.176 
(0.553) 
0.071 
(0.661) 
-0.097 
(0.409) 
South     
Price -0.382*** 
(0.066) 
0.077 
(0.163) 
 0.064** 
(0.067) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
1.516*** 
(0.534) 
0.096 
(1.792) 
 0.005 
(0.222) 
Store size  0.018** 
(0.008) 
   
Log distance to store -0.004 
(1.398) 
0.092 
(0.998) 
0.064 
(0.332) 
-0.112** 
(0.547) 
West     
Price -0.204 
(0.221) 
0.009 
(0.030) 
 0.013 
(0.009) 
Log count of fruits 
and vegetables UPCs 
1.077*** 
(0.014) 
0.594 
(0.454) 
 0.342*** 
(0.044) 
Store size  0.007 
(0.067) 
   
Log distance to store -0.148 
(0.104) 
0.372** 
(0.177) 
0.038*** 
(0.067) 
-0.089 
(0.085) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote significance levels at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Asymptotically 
robust s.e. are reported in the parentheses. All regressions include quarter, chain and county fixed 
effects. 
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Table E7. Regional Heterogeneity in Average Change in County Level Consumer Welfare  
 
Region No. of FV UPCs 
Compensating 
Variation  
(10 years) 
Compensating 
Variation 
(20 years) 
Cost 
Northeast 50 $1,555,366 $2,586,121 $3,383,700 
 100 $4,233,721 $6,982,327 $3,383,700 
 250 $4,782,581 $8,009,160 $3,383,700 
 350 $7,127,677 $11,744,973 $4,511,600 
 1200 $9,929,800 $13,655,557 $4,511,600 
Midwest 50 $806,661 $1,341,243 $3,383,700 
 100 $928,243 $1,496,220 $3,383,700 
 250 $1,381,577 $2,344,337 $3,383,700 
 350 $1,493,275 $2,482,882 $4,511,600 
 1200 $5,773,610 $8,033,170 $4,511,600 
South 50 $1,310,796 $2,074,615 $3,383,700 
 100 $1,966,784 $3,007,804 $3,383,700 
 250 $2,318,378 $3,959,644 $3,383,700 
 350 $4,441,735 $7,643,530 $4,511,600 
 1200 $5,836,500 $8,114,384 $4,511,600 
West 50 $1,940,128 $3,225,868 $3,383,700 
 100 $2,709,234 $4,504,667 $3,383,700 
 250 $4,120,251 $6,850,778 $3,383,700 
 350 $6,606,310 $10,984,370 $4,511,600 
 1200 $9,750,000 $13,565,760 $4,511,600 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
increase the number of fruits and vegetables in the nearest non-grocery store of each food deserts 
census tract.  
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Table E8. Regional Heterogeneity in Average Change in County Level Consumer Welfare  
 
Region Price Reduction 
Compensating 
Variation  
(10 years) 
 
Cost  
(10 years) 
Compensating 
Variation 
(20 years) 
 
Cost 
(20 years) 
Northeast 1% $1,749,762 $1,034,528 $2,567,283 $2,069,056 
 5% $6,002,029 $5,872,238 $11,483,249 $11,744,476 
 10% $9,387,070 $6,897,246 $14,783,767 $13,794,492 
 20% $20,859,237 $12,672,344 $32,872,095 $25,344,688 
 30% $48,726,915 $30,783,372 $89,872,983 $61,566,744 
Midwest 1% $2,552,749 $578,634 $3,493,926 $1,157,268 
 5% $9,458,876 $2,003,478 $18,784,410 $4,006,956 
 10% $15,764,876 $4,234,663 $26,986,698 $8,469,326 
 20% $30,242,925 $8,678,332 $43,926,457 $17,356,664 
 30% $81,283,050 $24,653,127 $109,180,386 $49,306,254 
South 1% $1,786,326 $663,556 $4,008,784 $1,327,112 
 5% $9,098,769 $2,764,334 $16,897,437 $5,528,668 
 10% $14,879,084 $5,003,672 $24,669,594 $10,007,344 
 20% $28,897,487 $9,778,335 $42,789,378 $19,556,670 
 30% $78,783,456 $25,622,109 $107,874,569 $51,244,218 
West 1% $1,237,879 $893,378 $2,008,231 $1,786,756 
 5% $4,897,783 $3,347,347 $7,342,779 $6,694,694 
 10% $8,767,896 $5,567,338 $13,623,145 $11,134,676 
 20% $18,678,749 $11,678,376 $30,221,467 $23,356,752 
 30% $45,768,923 $28,376,228 $86,673,541 $56,752,456 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
decrease prices in the nearest non-grocery store of each food desert census tract by different 
percentages as indicated in the price reduction column. 
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Table E9. Regional Heterogeneity in Consumer Welfare Per Household Per Year 
 
Region Price 
Reduction 
Total Food 
Deserts 
Non-
Food 
Deserts 
Total Food 
Deserts 
Non-
Food 
Deserts 
Northeast 1% $2.46 $3.15 $2.13 0.33% 0.42% 0.28% 
 5% $23.87 $25.64 $19.76 3.18% 3.42% 2.63% 
 10% $43.65 $50.83 $39.62 5.82% 6.78% 5.26% 
 20% $68.57 $78.67 $60.99 9.14% 10.50% 8.10% 
 30% $120.96 $135.79 $112.60 16.13% 18.12% 14.96% 
Midwest 1% $3.81 $5.11 $3.54 0.54% 0.72% 0.50% 
 5% $27.57 $30.38 $26.20 3.88% 4.29% 3.68% 
 10% $57.19 $65.09 $54.25 8.05% 9.18% 7.61% 
 20% $84.16 $90.68 $80.48 11.84% 12.79% 11.29% 
 30% $147.28 $167.91 $140.37 20.72% 23.69% 19.69% 
South 1% $3.66 $4.98 $3.42 0.52% 0.70% 0.48% 
 5% $26.92 $29.79 $25.99 3.80% 4.20% 3.65% 
 10% $55.72 $59.25 $52.37 7.86% 8.36% 7.36% 
 20% $82.38 $87.23 $79.35 11.62% 12.31% 11.15% 
 30% $142.73 $162.87 $138.38 20.13% 22.98% 19.44% 
West 1% $2.23 $2.98 $2.03 0.30% 0.41% 0.28% 
 5% $20.75 $23.63 $18.29 2.82% 3.21% 2.48% 
 10% $41.87 $48.24 $36.60 5.69% 6.56% 4.97% 
 20% $65.78 $74.67 $58.21 8.94% 10.16% 7.91% 
 30% $117.67 132.65 $110.32 15.99% 18.04% 14.99% 
Notes: Computations were done using 2015 CPI-adjusted dollars. The counterfactual policy is to 
decrease prices in the nearest non-grocery store of each food desert census tract by different 
percentages as indicated in the price reduction column. 
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APPENDIX F. SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER THREE 
 
Table F1. Annual Average County-Level Welfare Impact of Food 4 Less Entry into Most 
Severe Food Deserts 
 
 Welfare Change Percentage Change 
Change in Consumer Welfare $3,841,740 
($8,120,405) 
89.1% 
(84.8%) 
Change in Variable Profits -$3,623,618 
($9,002,080) 
-40.2% 
(30.1%) 
Incumbent Stores -$3,746,518 
($9,015,780) 
-60.4% 
(15.4%) 
New Walmart Stores $122,900 
($76,200)  
Total Welfare $218,122 
($1,613,234) 
25.9% 
(34.2%) 
Notes: mean (standard deviations) are presented in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
